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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview and Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation comprises three discrete empirical papers, with an introductory essay 
that evaluates the impact of different federal policies on prescription drug prices, utilization, 
and spending. Two main databases are used: (a) Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data and (b) 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data. These two databases are designed to track 
Medicaid drug utilization and overall medical use and expenditures, respectively. The variables 
of interest in this dissertation are prescription drug price, prescription drug use and spending, 
and overall drug expenditures. 
The objective of the first paper (Chapter 2) is to examine whether oncology drug prices 
have significantly changed because the Medicaid rebate increased under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The analytic sample includes top-selling oncology drugs, both 
branded and generic, over an 8-year time period. The prices of top-selling oncology drugs in 
2006 were followed through 2013 to find the extent to which drug prices have changed while 
controlling for state fixed-effect, package size, type of manufacturer, brand or generic, and drug 
strength. Thus, this study examines whether and to what extent oncology drug prices have 
changed after the increase in the Medicaid rebate under the ACA. 
The second paper’s objective (Chapter 3) is to study whether Medicare Part D has 
reduced racial disparities in diabetes drug use, coverage, and spending since its implementation 
in 2006. The analytic sample includes individuals aged 55 years and older who had diabetes 
from 2001 to 2010. Although the impact of Medicare Part D has been studied from different 
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perspectives, its impact on racial disparities in drug use, coverage, and expenditures among 
diabetics has not been studied yet. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) focuses on the association between closing the Medicare 
doughnut hole and prescription drug utilization and spending for Medicare Part D beneficiaries 
with chronic diseases through 2013. The objective of the third paper is to determine whether 
the provisions of the ACA that close the coverage gap have affected prescription drug utilization 
and out-of-pocket (OOP) spending among Medicare seniors with Part D coverage. 
The results of this dissertation can help policymakers to understand the extent to which 
Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes were affected by Part D and how the provisions of the 
ACA that close the coverage gap have affected prescription drug use and spending for Medicare 
Part D beneficiaries. It also can help to find whether increasing the Medicaid rebate was 
associated with increases in cancer drug prices. 
Significance of the Dissertation 
This dissertation examines how closing the coverage gap and Medicare Part D have 
affected prescription drug utilization and spending for Medicare Part D beneficiaries. Also, it 
studies how oncology drug prices have changed after the increase in the Medicaid rebate under 
the ACA. Although there is some literature on how Medicare Part D has affected prescription 
drug utilization and OOP spending, there are several gaps that limit understanding. This 
dissertation addresses these limitations and contributes to the understanding of racial 
disparities in drug use and expenditures among diabetics, understanding of the impact of 
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closing the coverage gap on prescription drug utilization and spending, and understanding of 
oncology drug price changes after the ACA Medicaid rebate increase. 
Although prior research has primarily analyzed the impact of the initial Medicaid rebate 
without controlling for specific characteristics of manufacturers or drugs, no study has analyzed 
how oncology drug prices changed after the ACA Medicaid rebate increase. In other words, 
previous literature has only examined the Medicaid rebate of 1991. This study is among the first 
to estimate changes in oncology drug prices after the current Medicaid rebate increase while 
controlling for type of manufacturer (brand or generic), package size, drug strength, coverage 
type, and state and year fixed effects. 
Second, despite existing racial disparities in drug use and expenditures prior to 
Medicare Part D, only one study has examined the aggregated effect of Part D on racial 
disparities in drug use and expenditures. This study is among the first to specifically examine 
whether and to what extent Medicare Part D has affected racial disparities in drug use and 
expenditures among beneficiaries with diabetes. 
Third, prior literature has mostly focused on the impact of Part D on drug utilization and 
spending. This study is significant in that it is among the first to measure whether the provisions 
of the ACA that close the coverage gap have affected prescription drug spending and utilization 
among Medicare seniors with Part D coverage. This can help policymakers understand the 
financial impact of cost sharing and drug discount on utilization and spending among Medicare 
beneficiaries. 
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Chapter 2: The ACA Medicaid Rebate and Medicaid Drug Prices for Cancer 
Summary 
Prescription drug spending is a significant component of Medicaid total expenditures.1 
Numerous policies have aimed at controlling Medicaid prescription drug spending;2 however, 
these policies could have unintended impacts on drug prices and utilization.2–7 Among these 
policies is the Medicaid rebate that, under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
allows Medicaid to pay drug manufacturers the lowest price offered to any buyer. Under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), beginning in 2010, the Medicaid rebate for branded drugs increased 
from 15.1 to 23.1 percent of the average manufacturer price.8 It is unknown to what extent 
pharmaceutical companies will respond to this increase and how the rebate may change drug 
prices paid by Medicaid, particularly oncology drugs, across states.9–12 However, one approach 
to offset the rise is to increase drug prices for chronic conditions such as cancer, which is well 
represented across payers.13 
Cancer is the second cause of death after heart disease,14 and it accounts for about one-
fourth of Medicaid spending on specialty drugs.15 In this paper, I examine the extent to which 
oncology drug prices changed after the increase in the Medicaid rebate in 2010, using Medicaid 
state drug utilization data from 2006 to 2013.16 The Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data allow 
tracking of Medicaid drug utilization and spending by national drug code in all 50 states, yearly 
and quarterly. It also allows the calculation of average reimbursed price, because the dataset 
provides information about package size, units reimbursed, and amount reimbursed by 
Medicaid and non-Medicaid insurers. I will focus on top-selling oncology drugs by either unit 
10 
 
sold or retail sales in 2006. This includes top-selling drugs for breast, ovarian, bladder, prostate, 
colorectal, and lung cancer, and leukemia, because they have the highest incidence and 
mortality rates compared to other types of cancer.17 
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Introduction 
Medicaid was created under the Social Security Act of 1965 to help states provide health 
care coverage for low-income children and families, disabled people, poor seniors (individuals 
≥65 years), and pregnant women. Medicaid is the largest health coverage program in the 
United States and covers more than 60 million people.18,19 Although Medicaid is jointly funded 
by the federal and state governments, states have the authority to determine coverage criteria, 
the scope of services offered, and the process for reimbursing health care providers.20 
Outpatient prescription drug coverage is an optional service that states provide with relatively 
low cost sharing due to federally mandated low copayments and deductibles. However, it is one 
of the main challenges for states, as Medicaid covers low-income populations with high health 
care needs, prescription drug spending comprises a significant part of Medicaid total 
expenditures, and Medicaid has limited ability to negotiate with drug manufacturers over 
prescription drug prices.1, 21–32 
To secure better prices, control Medicaid drug spending, and eliminate price 
discrimination generated by Medicaid’s limited negotiating power, the Medicaid rebate 
program was created by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of October 1990 (OBRA 90). 
Under OBRA 90, drug manufacturers who sign a rebate agreement with the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services receive access to the Medicaid market in exchange for payment of a 
rebate.33,34 Under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, pharmaceutical manufacturers must pay 
a quarterly rebate directly to state Medicaid programs; the rebate is calculated based on 
average manufacturer price (AMP) and best price.33,34 AMP is the average price paid by 
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wholesalers to pharmaceutical manufacturers for drugs that are distributed to retail 
pharmacies; best price is the lowest price charged to any U.S purchaser. The goal of the best 
price is to secure the lowest possible price for Medicaid compared to other purchasers who are 
allowed to use bargaining power. Because manufacturers must release their best prices to the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), they are discouraged from giving steep 
discounts to other buyers. The rebate for all innovator single- or multiple-source branded drugs 
(those with a valid patent) was established by OBRA 90 as equal to 15.1 percent of the AMP or 
the difference between the AMP and the best price, whichever was greater. On the other hand, 
rebate amounts for non-innovator (generic) drugs were 11 percent of AMP.33 
Medicaid rebates and their association with drug prices are especially important for 
Medicaid beneficiaries with cancer. First, cancer is the second leading cause of death after 
heart disease in the United States.35 There are more than 580,000 cancer deaths each year in 
the U.S.; breast, lung, pancreatic, colon, and colorectal cancers constitute most cancer deaths.35 
Second, oncology products that are in research and development pipelines comprise more than 
one-third of all research drugs, and they are estimated to increase specialty drug spending.36 
About 150 drugs are currently under research and development to treat cancer, which is 
estimated to significantly increase national drug spending.37,38 Third, the share of total U.S. 
medical expenditures for cancer grew more rapidly for Medicaid than other payers.39 In other 
words, the share of cancer treatment costs paid by Medicaid tripled, to more than $7 billion; 
and increases in the prevalence of cancer account for 86 percent of overall cancer costs.39,40 
Fourth, the cancer prevalence rate is higher among Medicaid recipients compared to the 
national prevalence rate and the uninsured population.41 Cancer prevalence was 1.2 to 5.2 
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times higher among the Medicaid population compared to the national level.41 Fifth, Medicaid 
beneficiaries are in significantly worse health than adults who receive their coverage from an 
employer or insurance other than Medicaid.42 Finally, about 50 percent of oncology practices’ 
income comes through the “spread,” which is the difference between what pharmacies or 
prescribers actually pay for a drug and the average wholesale price (AWP), which is used for 
reimbursement by insurance companies.43 
Under the ACA, there were changes to the Medicaid rebate for the purpose of reducing 
Medicaid prescription drug spending. First, starting in 2010, the Medicaid rebate increased 
from 15.1 to 23.1 percent of the AMP for innovator drugs—that is, branded drugs with a valid 
patent. In other words, 23.1 percent of the AMP or the difference between the AMP and the 
best price per unit, whichever is greater, was applied to assess rebates. Also, the rebate amount 
for generic drugs increased from 11 percent to 13 percent of the AMP per unit.8 This means 
that Medicaid collects more rebates compared to the years prior to the ACA and overall 
Medicaid spending on prescription drugs is reduced. In other words, pharmaceutical firms now 
have to pay back a higher amount of money to state Medicaid agencies. Additionally, not only 
outpatient prescription drugs that are covered under Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) but also 
outpatient prescription drugs that are covered under Medicaid managed care organizations 
(MCO) are used to assess the Medicaid rebate.33,34 Coverage type is important, because 
individuals who have FFS coverage face no cost sharing or low copayments for filling 
prescription drugs. However, individuals with MCO coverage are more responsive, because they 
face cost sharing or copayments for filling prescription drugs. In addition, MCOs have some 
degree of negotiating power compared to FFS. 
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The increases in the ACA Medicaid rebates were implemented in March 2010; however, 
due to a lag in reporting and calculating, the increases in rebates became effective as of January 
2010. In other words, it was retroactive due to the nature of rebate calculation. Rebate 
amounts are paid on a quarterly basis; to calculate the rebate amounts, manufacturers must 
report the best price and AMP for each drug to the CMS within 30 days of the end of each 
calendar quarter. In addition, states need to report the Medicaid utilization for each covered 
drug in the quarter to the manufacturer within 60 days of the end of the quarter. Then, the 
manufacturer computes and pays the rebate amount to each state within 30 days of receiving 
the utilization information. Although it has been claimed that the Medicaid rebate helped states 
to reduce their spending,44 it is unknown to what extent oncology drug prices change after the 
Medicaid rebate, as oncology drugs comprise the biggest share of prescription drug spending. 
Thus, this study can help policymakers to understand how oncology drug prices have changed 
after the ACA. Also, it shows the extent to which oncology drug prices varied by coverage type 
(FFS vs. MCO). 
Literature Review 
This section discusses prior research on the correlation between the Medicaid rebates 
and prescription drugs. This includes a review of literature on the effect of Medicaid drug 
procurement, generic competition, and assessed fees on drug prices paid by Medicaid, 
utilization, and spending. First, I review the recent literature relevant to the correlation 
between the Medicaid rebates and drug prices, followed by a review of the literature on the 
effects of the Medicaid rebate on overall Medicaid prescription spending. This is followed by 
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the literature on the effect of the Medicaid rebate on drug access and market concentration. 
Finally, I review the recent literature trends in cancer drug prices. This section concludes with a 
summary of findings and demonstrates information gaps to highlight the necessity for further 
research regarding Medicaid rebate effects on drug prices paid by Medicaid. 
Drug Prices 
Several studies have been conducted since the inception of the Medicaid rebate 
program to examine the association between the Medicaid rebate and drug prices. In studies 
that have looked only at the association between the Medicaid rebate and drug prices, the 
magnitude of the effect depended on the type of drug, drug market share, and the difference 
between AMPs and the best price.45-47 The findings show that after the Medicaid rebate 
program began, pharmaceutical manufacturers reduced the amount of their best price 
discounts to private buyers, raised the AMPs, and charged higher launch prices.45-48 The seminal 
research that examined the effect of the Medicaid rebate was conducted by Fiona Scott 
Morton.46 She used a cardiovascular subset of IMS Health’s Drugstore and Hospital Audit data 
from 1989 through 1991 to investigate the extent to which pharmaceutical companies 
responded to the introduction of the Medicaid rebate in 1990. Using an ordinary least squares 
regression, she found the AWP of competitive cardiovascular brand drugs—those facing generic 
competition—rose about 4 percent, while the price of cardiovascular branded drugs did not 
significantly increase. She also found that generic manufacturers raised their drug prices once 
their markets become more concentrated. Morton concluded that the Medicaid rebate 
program increased drug prices for non-Medicaid consumers.46 
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None of the existing studies quantified and examined the association between the 
Medicaid rebates and drug prices by therapeutic class and manufacture type or by coverage 
type. These are important, as drug prices could vary by therapeutic class* and manufacturer 
type (generic vs. brand). Thus, the results of these articles are not generalizable to branded 
drugs in therapeutic classes other than cardiovascular. In addition, these studies did not include 
generic drugs in their sample of drugs studied. 
Medicaid Spending 
Existing literature demonstrates that the Medicaid rebate reduced Medicaid’s overall 
prescription spending. Using the CMS data on drugs dispensed in retail pharmacies in 2009, the 
Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found 
that Medicaid was paying almost one-quarter of what Medicare paid for 100 high-spending 
branded and generic drugs. The study concluded that the Medicaid rebate program significantly 
reduced Medicaid program costs.44 They also found that unadjusted wholesale acquisition costs 
(WAC), AMPs, and Medicaid payment amounts increased by 27, 34, and 40 percent, 
respectively. However, the Medicaid rebate program had generated enough savings to offset 
increases in branded drug prices.49 This shows that Medicaid’s net costs for branded drugs 
increased at a lower rate than inflation. Additionally, a study conducted by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office showed that Medicaid paid the lowest average net prices 
                                                          
*Specialty drugs like medications for cancer and hepatitis C are more expensive than nonspecialty drugs 
like medications for hypertension and hyperlipidemia. 
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across a sample of about 80 high-utilization and high-spending branded and generic drugs, 
compared to Medicare and the Department of Defense.50 
A general limitation of existing literature is the lack of a representative sample. The 
studies have focused only on the top 100 high-spending or high-utilization drugs instead of 
quantifying the effect by therapeutic class.49 Although the sample size included the top 100 
high-spending or high-utilization drugs, the effect may be varied or less significant for acute 
conditions and special cases such as cancer. Also, they did not control for other potential 
factors, such as substitution effects and package size, which could result in biased estimates. 
Drugs with a larger package size are usually cheaper than drugs with smaller package size, and 
the availability of a substitute can affect both drug price and utilization.51,52 Taking substitution 
effects and package size into account would enhance the validity of estimates. 
Access and Market Concentration 
Prior research has shown that the Medicaid rebate increased access to medications and 
that Medicaid market share is positively correlated with drug prices. In studies that have looked 
at the association between the Medicaid rebate and drug access, Okunade found that the 
Medicaid rebate program increased access to prescription drugs by stimulating retail 
transactions.53 Research has also shown that lower pre-rebate reimbursement rates increased 
the market concentration of generic drugs; higher Medicaid market share was associated with 
higher average drug prices.54,55 Duggan found that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
Medicaid market share was associated with a 7 to 10 percent increase in the average price of 
the 200 top-selling drugs using IMS health data and the CMS drug utilization files from 1997 to 
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2002.56 The average price of the 200 top-selling drugs paid by non-Medicaid payers would have 
been 13 percent lower if Medicaid pricing policies had not been in place. These studies showed 
that the Medicaid rebate program may increase access to prescription drugs, but it may also 
increase the average price paid by non-Medicaid payers. However, none of the existing 
literature employed a sample of cancer drugs. The changes in drug prices could vary by 
therapeutic class because drugs for specific conditions might be overrepresented in the 200 
top-selling drugs sample while other conditions had less representative drugs. 
Cancer Drug Prices 
Several studies have examined cancer drug prices and changes in price over time. Using 
the MEPS data, Tangka found that the medical costs of cancer have nearly doubled and the 
share of these costs paid for by Medicaid has increased.39 Existing literature that examines 
trends in the launch prices for oncology drugs approved between 1995 and 2013 in the U.S. 
shows that the average launch price of anticancer drugs, adjusted for inflation and health 
benefits, increased by 12 percent annually—or an average of $8,500 per year.48 Literature also 
shows that insurance payments per patient per month in the first year of chemotherapy for 
oncology drugs more than doubled in 10 years; growth in drug prices both at launch and post-
launch contributed to payer spending growth.57 In addition, following the loss of U.S. patent 
exclusivity for oncology drugs, average monthly price declined by more than 20 percent after 
generic entry. However, average prices for drugs produced by branded manufacturers rose, 
while prices for drugs produced by generic manufacturers fell upon patent expiration.58 
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Literature Gap 
The recent increase in the Medicaid rebate through the ACA and the application of 
Medicaid rebates to drugs that are covered through managed care plans has not yet been 
studied, especially for oncology drugs. Existing literature examines the association between the 
Medicaid rebates and drug prices, access to medication, and Medicaid program cost. Overall, 
the literature demonstrates that the Medicaid rebate policy has been beneficial for the 
Medicaid program and has reduced costs through generating enough savings to offset increases 
in drug prices. Prior research suggests that the Medicaid rebate encourages manufacturers to 
increase drugs’ AMPs and to reduce the size of discounts to private payers. However, the 
existing literature does not stratify the effect of Medicaid rebate by therapeutic class, coverage 
type, or manufacturer type (brand or generic). These factors are important, as specialty drugs, 
such as medications for cancer, are more expensive than non-specialty drugs, and coverage 
type could affect drug prices. This study contributes to the literature because it is the only one 
that estimates the association between the increase in the Medicaid rebates under the ACA and 
changes in oncology drug prices. Since 1997, no study has been conducted to measure the 
association between the Medicaid rebate and drug prices. Conducting this study will show the 
extent to which oncology drug prices have changed after the increase in the ACA Medicaid 
rebate while controlling for prescription drug coverage type, package size, and type of 
manufacturer. 
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Aims and Hypotheses 
Prescription drug prices play an important role in increasing healthcare costs, especially 
for Medicaid due to its limited negotiating power. Although the Medicaid rebate aims to secure 
better prices and reduce Medicaid drug spending, it could have unintended effects on drug 
prices by encouraging pharmaceutical firms to increase drug prices, particularly for specialty 
drugs such as cancer drugs that have a high profit margin. 
I propose to examine the extent to which oncology drug prices changed after the recent 
increases in the ACA Medicaid rebate. The basic intuition is that pharmaceutical firms now have 
to pay back a higher amount of money to state Medicaid agencies. In addition, drug prices paid 
by Medicaid are a set fraction of the average price paid by non-Medicaid payers. Therefore, 
manufacturers could increase drug prices to offset the higher costs. The effect would be higher 
for brand-name drugs, as they face a higher rebate increase compared to generic drugs and are 
also more expensive than generics. An increase in rebate would have a bigger impact on the 
rebate amount, especially for brand-name drugs. The study will determine whether oncology 
drug prices have changed since the Medicaid rebate increased in 2010. The specific aim is: 
1. Examine changes in oncology drug prices after the ACA Medicaid rebate increases. 
H1: Medicaid prices for oncology drugs will increase following the Medicaid rebate 
because firms may offset the cost of higher rebates that they have to pay to the 
Medicaid. 
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H2: Drug price indicators such as WAC will increase for brand-name drugs following the 
Medicaid rebate increase because existing drug prices in the private market are used 
to set the Medicaid prices. 
H3: Oncology drug prices will be lower for drugs that are covered under Medicaid 
managed care compared to FFS plans. 
Conceptual Framework and Economic Theory 
Price discrimination occurs when a pharmaceutical company charges different prices to 
different consumers for an identical drug. The economic theory behind this behavior is based 
on price elasticity of demand. Consumers who have inelastic demand are more likely to be 
charged a higher price compared to consumers with elastic demand. Low-income consumers 
have higher price elasticity, meaning their consumption will decrease if drug prices increase. 
As Medicaid recipients who are not enrolled in a managed care plan face no cost sharing 
or low copayments for filling prescription drugs, once they enroll in the program they have 
perfectly inelastic demand for prescription drugs.56 Although Medicaid has some leverage—
such as a preferred drugs list, prior authorization, and supplemental rebates—to control large 
increases in drug prices, inelastic demand for Medicaid recipients may create significant 
incentives for pharmaceutical firms to raise drug prices in the private market, especially when 
they face financial burdens such as rebates. In addition, as the government relies on existing 
prices in private sectors, tying drug prices paid by Medicaid to the AMP and the best price can 
adversely affect other consumers who have private insurance or are uninsured via increasing 
drug prices. 
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For a pharmaceutical firm that has a patented drug, the drug has a constant marginal 
cost and the demand for the drug does not influence the demand for other products produced 
by the same firm. Thus, the company has market power due to patent protection. Based on a 
model proposed by Duggan,59 the drug price is associated with demand elasticity at the optimal 
price. Therefore, the greater the inelasticity in demand, the higher the price. However, in the 
Medicaid market, the optimal price is associated with the ratio of Medicaid prescriptions to 
non-Medicaid purchases and the reimbursement rate. In other words, as the number of 
Medicaid beneficiaries increases under the ACA, the effective demand elasticity declines, 
therefore prompting firms to pursue profit-maximizing behavior by increasing drug prices. 
Given the inelastic demand of Medicaid recipients, firms’ market power over patented drugs, 
and Medicaid drug procurement that uses AMP and best price to set the Medicaid rebate, 
pharmaceutical firms can increase drug prices to non-Medicaid consumers in order to charge 
higher drug prices to Medicaid. Therefore, it is more likely to see manufacturers to increase 
drug prices in order to offset associated costs and maximize their profit. 
Additionally, drugs sold in large package sizes or drugs with lower strength have a lower 
per unit price than those sold in small packages or have higher strength, respectively. As the 
government uses the best price to assess the rebate, drugs with a large package size are more 
likely to have the best price. Thus, firms are more likely to raise the price of drugs that have 
larger package sizes or lower strength compared to those with smaller packages or higher 
strength, respectively. In this analysis, I include drug characteristics as prescription drug prices 
are associated with drug package size, strength, and dosage form. I also include the type of 
service that Medicaid beneficiaries were covered under (FFS vs. MCO), as coverage types are 
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associated with drug prices. People with FFS coverage would show a different price elasticity 
than people with MCO coverage. In addition, MCOs have some degree of negotiation power 
compared to FFSs. 
Overall, prescription drug prices are different by manufacturer type (brand vs. generic). 
In addition, coverage type and drug characteristics, including strength, package size and dosage 
form, can change drug prices. Therefore, this analysis controls for all these factors. 
Methods 
Data 
This analysis uses 2006–2013 State Drug Utilization Data, collected by the Medicaid 
Drug Programs Data and Resources and maintained by the CMS. This publicly available 
database covers Medicaid beneficiaries in all states (except Arizona from 2006 to 2009).60 The 
State Drug Utilization Data includes all outpatient drugs that have been paid for by state 
Medicaid agencies since the inception of the Medicaid rebate program. Each record in the 
database contains an 11-digit national drug code (NDC), state name, drug name, year and 
quarter of Medicaid spending, the total number of units of the drug reimbursed by the state, 
the number of prescriptions reimbursed, number of pharmacy claims, and Medicaid and non-
Medicaid amount reimbursed (pre-rebate) to pharmacies, including drug costs and dispensing 
fees. Consistent with the literature, Medicaid amount reimbursed per unit was used as a proxy 
for generic drug prices covered by Medicaid, as the actual amount of rebates is not available to 
the public.61-63 
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To measure changes in brand-name drug prices for oncology, I used WAC, which is the 
list price for a pharmaceutical sold by a manufacturer to a wholesaler; WAC is consistent across 
the states for a given year, because it is a good representation of brand-name drug prices at 
retail pharmacies.64 However, WACs do not perfectly reflect retail prices for generic drugs, as 
many generic manufacturers do not have a WAC and there is no legal requirement for them to 
report WACs.65-68 Using WAC enabled me to have a generalizable estimate of how brand-name 
drug prices for cancer changed after the Medicaid rebates. I also chose WAC over AWP because 
experts believe that many AWPs are artificially inflated.9,54 Therefore, it could result in 
overpayment of the ingredient costs for drugs by state Medicaid programs. To obtain WACs, I 
used First Databank.† First Databank is the market leader in publishing pharmaceutical drug 
prices that are used within healthcare systems serving hospitals, payers, retail pharmacies, and 
state health programs such as Medicaid. It is crucial for manufacturers to report their prices to 
First Databank because almost all payers use their prices to reimburse providers. Using this 
database allowed me to have more price indicators and control for all possible drug price 
changes through the year. 
Finally, to obtain all drug-specific characteristics, including package size, dosage form, 
drug strength, manufacturer type (brand vs. generic), active ingredient, route of administration, 
                                                          
† http://www.fdbhealth.com/fdb-medknowledge-drug-pricing/ 
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manufacturer, and re-packager,‡ I used the Red Book§, which is available through Micromedex 
at the University of Maryland in Baltimore. 
Analytic Strategy 
A pre-post study design was used to evaluate the correlation between the Medicaid 
rebate increase and oncology drug prices after 2010 while controlling for the trend in drug 
prices before the ACA was implemented. In this analysis, I focused on 25 top-selling brand-
name and 10 top-selling generic drugs for cancer in 2006 and followed them through 2013. I 
chose these top-selling drugs because they constituted more than 90 percent of oncology drugs 
in either unit sold or retail sales in 2006. Over the time period of the analysis, a drug could start 
as a branded drug that had a valid patent, then change to a competitive brand that is a brand-
name drug with a generic substitute. These drugs in 2006 were chosen using the 
PharmacyTimes.com** and Drugs.com websites.†† PharmacyTimes.com is a website from the 
clinically based journal of the same name, which provides information for pharmacists. In 
                                                          
‡ Firms that take a finished drug product from a container in which it was distributed by the original 
manufacturer and place it into a different container without further manipulation of the drug. 
http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-
gen/documents/document/ucm434176.pdf 
§ http://www.redbook.com/redbook/online/ 
** http://www.PharmacyTimes.com 
†† http://www.Drugs.com 
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addition, it provides information for the top 200 most prescribed or 200 top-selling prescription 
drugs using IMS Health data. This is important, as IMS Health data‡‡ captures 100 percent of the 
total U.S. pharmaceutical market for measuring sales at actual prices. Therefore, this enhances 
the validity of PharmacyTimes reports as a valuable and credible alternative to large fee-based 
prescription drug databases. In addition, I used Drugs.com to identify oncology drugs and 
control for any possible generic substitute. 
As Figure 1 presents, after finalizing the top-selling brand and generic drugs for cancer, I 
combined observations for all states available in the 2006–2013 State Drug Utilization Data 
files, resulting in 126,390 records. I excluded the District of Columbia (DC) because almost all 
NDCs for DC did not match Food and Drug Administration data, and reported codes were not 
found on any websites. I excluded Arizona because no data were available for 2006–2009. I also 
removed observations with missing drug names and those that reported re-packagers as the 
manufacturer, because price setting for these drugs is different than for branded and regular 
generic drugs. Finally, after removing re-packagers, Arizona and DC, and all non-related and 
missing observations, I ended up with 124,663 records or 335 unique NDCs. This analysis is 
divided by manufacturer type (brand and generic). 
 Generic Drugs 
Medicaid amount reimbursed per unit was used as a proxy for generic drug prices paid 
by Medicaid. After completing the list of oncology drugs, I computed each medication’s price as 
                                                          
‡‡ https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%20Institute/NSP_Data_Brief-.pdf 
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Medicaid reimbursement amount divided by the total number of units for the NDC in each year, 
which I will refer to throughout as the Medicaid drug price. In other words, it is the amount 
Medicaid paid for each unit of a drug. The price of each NDC was averaged if multiple 
observations existed in the same year for each state. In other words, for each NDC in any given 
state, the Medicaid drug price was averaged for each year. 
The equation below represents the basic structure that was used to estimate the 
changes in generic oncology drug prices after the ACA rebate increase. 
 Yit= β0 + β1 MRit + β2 State + β3 Year + Zi + εit (1) 
In this model, i represents an NDC and t represents year. Y denotes the outcome 
measure, which is the Medicaid price for generic oncology drugs. To examine the effect of the 
Medicaid rebate increase on Medicaid drug prices, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and excluded observations that reported a zero value for Medicaid drug price, as 
they represent the years before states started to cover a drug. MR is a dummy variable to 
represent the time of legislation (January 2010); it is 0 for the period prior to 2010 and 1 for 
2010 and after. State is a categorical variable to reflect the state fixed effects. This controls for 
the differences in drug prices across states and any changes apart from the Medicaid rebate 
increase that may affect drug prices. I also used Year as a continuous variable to control for any 
secular increase in drug prices for a given year apart from inflation. Z is a vector of all other 
covariates that could affect the outcome such as package size, drug strength, coverage type, 
and drug formula. As previously mentioned, to control for package size, dosage form, and drug 
strength, I used Red Book and merged it with my database. 
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 Branded Drugs 
Instead of Medicaid drug price, I used WAC to estimate changes in competitive brand 
and branded drug prices for cancer drugs after the Medicaid rebate increase, as WAC is a good 
representation of what retail pharmacies actually pay for brand-name drugs.64 In addition, 
unlike the Medicaid drug price, WAC is consistent across the states for a given year. 
The equation below represents the basic structure of the model that I used to estimate 
the brand-name oncology drug price change after the ACA Medicaid rebate increase. 
 Yit= β0 + β1 MRit + β2 Brandi + β3 (MR*Brand)it + β4 Year + Zi + εit (2) 
In this model, i represents an NDC and t represents year. Y denotes the outcome 
measure, which is WAC for oncology drugs. To measure the effect of the Medicaid rebate 
increase on WAC, I applied OLS regression using the natural log of adjusted WAC as the 
outcome. As the WAC value for all branded drugs does not include zero, I chose OLS with a 
natural log. However, to address the smearing effect and take uncertainty in the 
retransformation factor into account, I applied Delta method to compute correct predicted 
values and standard errors.69 MR is a dummy variable to represent the time of legislation 
(January 2010); it is 0 for the period prior to 2010 and 1 for 2010 and after. I used Year as a 
continuous variable to control for any secular increase in drug prices for a given year apart from 
inflation. However, I did not include the state fixed effects as in a given period WACs are 
consistent across all states. Brand is a dummy variable to represent branded or competitive 
brand drugs. It is 1 if it is a branded drug and 0 if it is a competitive brand. As I was interested to 
find the extent to which branded drug prices changed after the ACA, I used an interaction term 
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between Brand and MR. This estimate shows the extent to which oncology drug prices, by drug 
type, have changed after the ACA. In other words, I used marginal effects to predict actual drug 
prices for every combination of MR and Brand. I also controlled for other covariates that are 
listed for model 1. 
All Medicaid drug prices and WACs were converted to inflation-adjusted 2013 dollars 
using the all-items Consumer Price Index (CPI). I used CPI all-items instead of CPI-drugs because 
it represents all goods and services purchased for consumption, including prescription drugs. In 
addition, the inability of CPI-drugs to properly adjust for quality and entry of new drugs reduces 
its precision. Therefore, I used the CPI all-items adjustment to have a better and more 
generalizable price representative.70 Stata 12 was used to conduct all statistical analyses 
(StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
The overall analytic sample included a total of 124,663 observations of top-selling 
oncology branded and generic drugs in 2006 that were followed through 2013. As Table 1 
shows, these records represent 335 unique NDCs and a majority of them are parenteral 
(injectable). These observations represent 36 top-selling oncology drugs of which 25 are 
branded drugs and the rest are generics. Competitive brand drugs—those with generic 
substitutes—comprise 10 of the 25 top-selling branded drugs. Some people may be concerned 
that WAC is not an accurate indicator of drug prices purchased by prescribers; however, studies 
show that physicians usually purchase drugs at wholesale prices.71,72 
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Figure 3 represents the simple trend in WACs—adjusted for inflation—for all drugs 
without controlling for any other factors. The results show that average adjusted WACs for 
branded and competitive brand drugs were higher in post-period compared to pre-period. 
Figure 4 represents the simple trend in average annual Medicaid drug prices—adjusted 
for inflation—for oncology drugs. The results show that average adjusted Medicaid prices did 
not increase for generic drugs in post-period compared to pre-period. 
The ACA Medicaid Rebate and Medicaid Prices for Generic Oncology Drugs 
Table 2 represents estimates of an OLS model using adjusted Medicaid reimbursement 
amount divided by the total number of units as the dependent variable. In other words, it 
shows the coefficient estimate from a dummy variable representing the implementation of the 
ACA in the regression model. Average annual price for each NDC was used in this analysis. The 
results show that after the implementation of the Medicaid rebate, average prices for generic 
oncology drugs increased by $28. Therefore, I find that the average price of top-selling generic 
anticancer drugs—adjusted for inflation—increased by $28 after the rebate increase. 
The results also show that the average generic oncology drug prices under MCOs cost 
about $12 less than generic oncology drugs under FFS. Drug strength and year are strongly and 
negatively correlated with generic drug prices. A detailed table of all coefficients is presented in 
the appendix. 
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The ACA Medicaid Rebate and Wholesale Acquisition Costs for Brand-Name Oncology Drugs 
Table 3 represents the coefficient estimates of an OLS model using natural log of 
adjusted wholesale acquisition costs as the dependent variable. As WAC is not an appropriate 
price indicator for generic oncology drugs, I excluded generic drugs from this analysis. The 
results show that after the ACA rebate provision in 2010, average WACs for all brand-name 
oncology drugs combined (branded and competitive brand) significantly increased by 2.4 
percentage points, which is about $85, from $295 to $380. The results also show that oncology 
drug prices for a competitive brand are about 5.5 percentage points lower compared to brand-
name drugs. 
Table 4 represents predicted values of the coefficient estimate from the interaction 
variable representing brand-name drug prices, by type, after the implementation of the ACA 
Medicaid rebate in Table 3. In other words, I converted the coefficient estimates to a dollar 
value to show the extent to which drug prices have changed. The results show that after the 
implementation of the Medicaid rebate, average WACs for branded oncology drugs increased 
by $154, from $305 before the ACA to $459 after the implementation of the ACA Medicaid 
rebate. Also, for competitive brand oncology drugs, average WACs increased by $235, from $45 
before the ACA to $280 after the implementation of the ACA Medicaid rebate. A detailed table 
of all coefficients is presented in the appendix. 
Discussion 
The findings of this study demonstrate that the ACA Medicaid rebate increase was 
associated with significant increases in generic oncology drug prices measured by Medicaid 
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drug prices and oncology brand-name drug prices measured by WACs. The increase in oncology 
drug prices likely reflects the increases in the Medicaid rebate formula for both branded and 
generic drugs, from 15.1 to 23.1 percent of the AMP for branded drugs and from 11 to 13 
percent for generic drugs. Therefore, a significant increase in drug prices after the Medicaid 
rebate increase can increase overall prescription drug costs paid by non-Medicaid payers via 
increasing WACs. As previously mentioned, because existing drug prices paid by non-Medicaid 
payers are used to set drug prices paid by Medicaid, any increase in drug prices, like WACs, 
could result in a higher pre-rebate reimbursement amount and overall prescription drug costs. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the association between the current 
Medicaid rebate and oncology drug prices while controlling for manufacturer type (brand or 
generic), package size, drug strength, availability of generic substitutes, coverage type, and 
state fixed effects. There are, however, a number of limitations to the analysis. 
First, because all reported data are pre-rebate§§ and federally mandated or state 
supplementary rebates are not publicly available, I used the payment per prescription 
presented in this study as a proxy for Medicaid prescription drug prices. This may result in 
overestimating to some degree the actual acquisition cost to Medicaid programs. However, the 
                                                          
§§ Pre-rebate amount refers to the amount Medicaid reimbursed to pharmacies without considering the 
rebate amounts they receive from manufacturers. This is different than the actual drug prices paid by 
Medicaid, since Medicaid receives the rebate from manufacturers; because the rebates are confidential, 
it would be difficult to make any conclusion about the actual prices that Medicaid paid for each drug. 
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goal of this analysis is to examine the extent to which oncology drug prices have changed after 
the ACA. 
Second, unlike WACs, Medicaid drug prices are specific to the Medicaid population, who 
make up about 20 percent of the U.S. population. The age and sex distributions for the 
Medicaid population are substantially different from the general U.S. population, with higher 
proportions of women and children. Therefore, other therapeutic classes may demonstrate 
different drug price changes than oncology drugs, because they may not be well represented 
among this population. However, this analysis measures WACs, which are consistent across 
payers for any given drug. 
Third, as any outpatient prescription drug that states cover under either FFS or MCO 
could be used to assess the rebates, it is impossible to have a control group. Previously known 
inpatient drugs, which were exempted from the rebate, are now prescribed in physician offices, 
outpatient facilities, or nursing homes, and they would be counted as outpatient drugs. 
Therefore, under the new policy, almost all drugs are subjected to the Medicaid rebate. I could 
not find any drug that is exempted from the Medicaid rebate to use as a control group. Having 
no control group reduces the likelihood of drawing a causal effect. 
Because I could not find an appropriate control group and there are other provisions 
under the ACA that may affect drug prices, it would be difficult to say that all increases in 
oncology drug prices are due to an increase in the Medicaid rebates. Although there were some 
hurdles in establishing causality between the Medicaid rebate increase and increases in drug 
price, I controlled for available factors that may have altered drug prices, excluding rebates, 
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AMPs, and best prices. Therefore, it may be reasonable to assume that the changes in drug 
prices are mostly due to the ACA, which is consistent and aligns with increases in the Medicaid 
rebates and the hypotheses. Even though I cannot establish causality between the Medicaid 
rebate increase and oncology drug prices, this study contributes to the literature because it is 
the only one that estimates the association between the increase in the Medicaid rebates 
under the ACA and oncology drug prices. Since 1997, no study has been conducted to measure 
the association between the Medicaid rebate and drug prices. 
The results show that WACs increased more for competitive brand compared to 
branded oncology drugs after the ACA. A duopoly environment—when there are only two 
sellers—and marketing agreement between the brand and the generic manufacturers enable 
the brand manufacturer to continue pricing its branded product high after losing patent 
protection. Prior research has shown that brand-name manufacturers do not lower their prices 
in response to a generic entry;73,74 however, having more generic entrants after patent 
expiration would significantly decrease generic drug prices.75 
I performed several sensitivity checks. First, I used CPI-medical care instead of CPI all-
items, and the results did not change. Using CPI-medical care, Medicaid price for generic and 
branded oncology drugs increased by $42 (p<0.01). Also, WAC for branded and competitive 
brand oncology drugs increased by $140 (p<0.01) and $236 (p<0.01), respectively. Second, I 
limited the sample size to those branded drugs that did not go off-patent during the study 
period. The results show that WAC increased by $44 (p<0.01), from $474 to $518 for branded 
oncology drugs. Third, I excluded observations that had a zero value for Medicaid drug prices. 
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The results show that Medicaid price for generic oncology drugs increased by $37 (p<0.01), 
from $41.5 to $78.5. Lastly, I excluded the year 2010 because it might have taken a while for 
pharmaceutical firms to respond to this policy. The results show that for the competitive brand 
and branded oncology drugs, WAC increased by $257 (p<0.01) and $170 (p<0.01), respectively. 
In sum, the findings from this study suggest that oncology drug prices have increased 
after the ACA. As expected, pharmaceutical companies increased their drug prices to offset 
costs associated with changes under the ACA, such as increases in rebate. However, it would be 
hard to estimate whether the government is paying more than it expects for the ACA, because 
rebate amounts are not available to researchers and the public. 
The results of this paper could be of great interest to federal or state governments, 
advocates, and policymakers who are interested in bending the health care cost curve and 
having an efficient healthcare system. Although this study cannot reveal the actual acquisition 
cost of oncology drugs to Medicaid programs, it shows that pharmaceutical companies appear 
to have increased oncology drug prices to offset costs associated with increases in the rebate. 
Because the ACA will increase the number of insured consumers who receive drug benefits, 
increasing drug prices could undermine benefits of the ACA expansion; it could diminish drug 
adherence and effective utilization by affecting consumers’ copays and out-of-pocket spending. 
Rising WACs for oncology drugs make these drugs expensive for other non-Medicaid insurers 
and private payers. Therefore, Medicaid drug procurement policies could have unintended 
impacts on drug prices and overall prescription drug expenditures by increasing drug prices 
paid by non-Medicaid payers. Although the Medicaid rebate helps state Medicaid programs to 
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generate revenues, any major change in drug prices would have a significant fiscal impact on 
states’ budgets. The results of this paper can also help policymakers and state governments to 
have a deep understanding of the ACA impact on drug prices and draft efficient policies to 
control costs. 
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Figure 1: Selection Process of Medicaid State Drug Utilization Records 
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Figure 2: All Databases Used in This Analysis 
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Figure 4: Average Annual Medicaid Drug Prices by Manufacturer Type 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Drugs Included in This Study 
Outcome Number 
Total number of 
records 
124,663 
Total number of 
unique NDCs 
335 
Dosage forms 
Capsule 
Tablet 
Injection/powder 
Cream 
36 
69 
227 
3 
Number of drugs 
36 
Generic Brand 
Competitive 
brand* 
11 25 10 
Herceptin **  Velcade ** Campath ** 
Arimidex ** Erbitux ** Faslodex ** 
Femara **  Eloxatin ** Sprycel ** 
Xeloda **  Gleevec ** Alimta ** 
Avastin **  Rituxan ** Casodex ** 
Taxotere **  Nexavar ** Gemzar **  
Tarceva **  Bexxar ** Vectibix ** 
Aromasin **  Efudex **  Hycamtin **  
Temodar **  Doxorubicin  Thiotepa  
Vinblastine Vincristine  Amifostine 
Carboplatin  Topotecan  Etoposide 
Dactinomycin Fludarabine  Tamoxifen  
*Number of branded drugs that have generic substitutes. 
**Brand-name drugs (both branded and competitive brand drugs). 
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Model Estimates of the Change in Generic Oncology Drug Prices After 
Medicaid Rebate Increase 
Outcome Estimates (SE) 
Program 28.62** (12.58) 
Type of payment (FFS) 
Managed care 
 
-11.86*** (3.908) 
year -8.715*** (2.944) 
strength1 -2.508** (1.105) 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measures is presented in parentheses. 
**p<0.05. ***p<0.01. 
Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Model (Log-Linear) Estimates of the Change in WACs for Brand-Name 
Oncology Drugs After Medicaid Rebate Increase 
Outcome Estimates (SE) 
Target group 
Program*Competitive Brand 
 
-0.109*** (0.005) 
Program 0.0234*** (0.002) 
Drug Type (Brand) 
Competitive Brand 
 
-0.535*** (0.005) 
Type of payment (FFS) 
Managed care 
 
-0.004*** (0.001) 
strength1 0.556*** (0.001) 
year 0.052*** (0.006) 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measure is presented in parentheses. 
***p<0.01. 
Table 4: Adjusted Estimates of WACs for Brand-Name Oncology Drugs After the ACA 
Type of drug Before  After  Difference 
Branded  $305 $459  $154*** 
Competitive 
brand 
$45 $280 $235*** 
***p<0.01. 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Medicare Part D on Racial Disparities in Drug Use, Coverage, and 
Expenditures Among Diabetics 
Summary 
Prior to 2003, there were significant disparities in drug utilization and spending between 
Whites and minorities, particularly among seniors (individuals ≥65 years), and senior minorities 
spent less on and used fewer medications on average compared to Whites.76-79 Medicare Part D 
was enacted under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 to reduce costs, increase 
efficiency, and increase access to prescription medications for seniors and disabled persons.80-83 
However, a unique feature of Part D prescription drug coverage is the so-called “doughnut 
hole,”*** which can substantially increase out-of-pocket (OOP) spending for beneficiaries, 
especially those with higher utilization due to chronic diseases.80-85 Among high drug utilizers 
who have chronic diseases, diabetic patients are prominent; diabetes is the seventh leading 
cause of death in the United States, with an annual cost of $245B.86,87 Almost 60 percent of 
annual diabetes treatment costs (about $150B), could be prevented by increasing drug 
access.87,88 Although diabetes is treatable, unequal access to prescription drugs and 
undiagnosed cases increase the risk of serious complications such as amputation, neuropathy, 
stroke, and nephropathy, which make diabetes an expensive disease to treat.89-91 
It is presumed that better access to prescription drugs will reduce disease complications 
and annual diabetes costs.89,92 However, it is unknown to what extent Medicare beneficiaries 
                                                          
*** The gap in drug coverage in which Medicare beneficiaries are responsible for all of the costs. 
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with diabetes have been affected by the implementation of Medicare Part D. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the impact of Medicare Part D on racial disparities in drug use, 
coverage, and expenditures among diabetics. This analysis is based on data from the 2001–
2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. These nationally representative data enable me to 
measure utilization, spending, and prescription drug coverage among beneficiaries with 
diabetes.93 
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Introduction 
Although Medicare was enacted under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act of 1965 to 
provide federally administered health insurance to individuals age 65 and older, regardless of 
income or medical history, it had limited outpatient prescription drug coverage for years.94 
Medicare Part D was enacted under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 to reduce costs, 
increase efficiency, and increase access to prescription medications for seniors and disabled 
persons.95,96 Prior to Medicare Part D, Medicare health maintenance organizations, employer 
plans, Medigap, and Medicaid were the main sources of drug coverage.97 There were significant 
discrepancies in drug utilization between Whites and minorities, particularly among seniors.76-79 
Although Part D was intended to reduce OOP spending and to increase access to prescription 
drugs for seniors, the existence of a coverage gap (the doughnut hole) can disproportionately 
increase OOP spending for beneficiaries from minority racial/ethnic groups relative to Whites, 
especially those with high prescription drug use.80-85 
Prior research has shown that minorities spend less on and use fewer prescription drugs 
compared with Whites due to limited coverage or high drug costs.78,98-101 It has also been 
shown that high OOP spending is associated with non-adherence to prescribed medicines; the 
likelihood of non-adherence is higher among beneficiaries with chronic diseases, especially 
those with diabetes.76,79,83-85,102 Among chronic diseases, diabetes is important because it is the 
seventh leading cause of death in the United States; 86 8.3 percent of the entire U.S. population 
(29 million people) and about 20 percent of senior populations were affected by diabetes in 
2012. Also, about 86 million Americans age 20 and older had pre-diabetes in 2012.103 Type II 
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diabetes accounts for about 95 percent of diabetes cases; approximately 40 percent of people 
with diabetes have three or more chronic conditions.103-105 Average medical expenditures of 
people with diagnosed diabetes is about $13,700 per year, of which about $8,000 is attributed 
to diabetes.103 Additionally, the burden of diabetes is disproportionately distributed among 
different ethnic groups, especially minorities.106 Senior minorities with diabetes spent less on 
and used fewer medications on average compared with Whites,77 while they had a higher 
diabetes prevalence, worse diabetes control, and higher diabetes complication rate compared 
to Whites.107-112 Although diabetes is manageable and treatable, unequal access to prescription 
drugs, low medication adherence, and undiagnosed cases increase the risk of diabetes 
complications that make diabetes an expensive disease to treat.89-90,91 The cost of diagnosed 
diabetes was $245 billion in 2012, of which $176 billion was attributable to direct medical costs 
and $69 billion was reduced productivity. Antidiabetic drugs only account for 12 percent of 
total direct costs, while inpatient care and treating diabetes complications account for more 
than 60 percent of the total cost.87 
Although Medicare Part D aimed to increase access to prescription medicines and 
reduce seniors’ OOP spending, uneven distribution of benefits among different racial groups 
can undermine the goal of Part D. Little is known about racial disparities in drug use, coverage, 
and expenditures among diabetics. To my knowledge, this study is the first that examines 
whether the implementation of Part D has affected racial disparities in drug use, coverage, and 
expenditures among diabetics. 
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Literature Review 
This section discusses prior research that has studied the impact of Medicare Part D on 
prescription drug utilization, OOP spending, and disparities. First, I review the recent literature 
relevant to the impact of Part D on Medicare spending. Then, I review the literature on the 
impact of Medicare Part D on prescription drug utilization and OOP spending. Finally, the last 
section reviews the literature on the effect of Medicare Part D on disparities in overall drug 
utilization and expenditures. This chapter concludes with a summary of findings and highlights 
literature gaps to emphasize the necessity for further research regarding the impact of 
Medicare Part D on racial disparities in drug utilization, coverage, and spending among 
diabetics. 
Medicare Expenditures 
There is a general consensus in the literature that has examined the budgetary impact 
of Medicare Part D on Medicare overall expenditures. Using three different sources of data—
the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review file, the Medicare Beneficiary file, and the Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey, and applying difference-in-differences methodology, Kaestner et al. 
found that Part D significantly reduced Medicare expenditures by 7 percent through an 8 
percent decrease in the number of hospital admissions and a 12 percent decrease in total 
resource utilization.113 Also, it has been shown that a $1 increase in prescription drug spending 
is associated with a $2.06 reduction in Medicare spending.114 However, the existing literature 
measures the overall impact of Part D without stratifying the effect by disease category. 
Medicare expenditures could vary by type of disease (chronic or acute); this is important 
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because beneficiaries with more than three chronic conditions account for more than 70 
percent of Medicare spending.115 Medicare spending can be reduced, because these chronic 
conditions are mostly manageable with better access to prescribed medicines. 
Out-of-Pocket Spending and Drug Utilization 
Several studies have been conducted since the inception of Medicare Part D to examine 
the impact of Medicare Part D on drug utilization and OOP spending. Existing literature 
demonstrates that the introduction of Medicare Part D was associated with a reduction in OOP 
spending and an increase in drug utilization. Despite the fact that researchers used different 
secondary and primary databases and various time frames, the results are consistent: OOP 
spending was significantly reduced after Part D implementation, with the degree of reduction 
ranging from 18 to 49 percent. Prescription drug utilization increased by 5 to 32 percent among 
Medicare beneficiaries.116-122 Studies have also shown that after the implementation of Part D, 
OOP spending decreased by $150 to $200 and the adjusted median number of prescriptions 
written annually increased by two to four prescriptions per patient year.123,124 However, these 
studies were limited either in terms of time frame, type of data, an inadequate control group, 
or specific patient groups. Additionally, they did not evaluate the impact of Part D by type of 
disease, especially diabetes. 
Racial Disparities 
Despite the use of different databases, existing literature demonstrates that senior 
minorities had lower drug utilization and a higher rate of non-adherence compared to senior 
Whites. They show that minorities’ drug utilization was 10 to 40 percent lower than Whites.76-
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79,83 Furthermore, the literature shows that Part D has affected minorities disproportionately by 
increasing the disparity in annual prescription spending between African-Americans and Whites 
by $258, while it decreased disparities in a number of prescriptions filled and OOP spending 
between Hispanics and Whites by 2.9 prescriptions and $143, respectively.125,126 On the other 
hand, a study by Chen et al.127 found that following Medicare Part D, disparities in OOP 
spending and the probability of having unmet drug needs decreased for African-Americans and 
Hispanics, respectively, compared with their White counterparts. Although both studies used 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data, the results are different; Chen et al. used 
2004—2007 data, whereas the other study used 2002–2009 data. Also, Chen et al. only 
included beneficiaries aged 65 and older in their analysis and had no control group; the other 
study included a control group and applied a different methodology, which was more thorough 
and accurate. 
Using MEPS data, Hussein et al.128 showed that Part D decreased the White–Hispanic 
disparity in overall adherence by 16 percentage points, while it increased White–Black disparity 
by 21 percentage points. Non-adherence to medicines due to high OOP is important because 
adherence to medicine is imperative for achieving therapeutic goals; poor adherence can have 
harmful consequences. Although adherence to medicines is not the focus of this study, current 
literature shows that the effect of Part D on adherence to medicines varied among different 
ethnic groups. This can impact disparities in utilization and spending because comorbid 
conditions, especially diabetes type II, can be easily managed and treated by improving 
adherence to medicines.103 
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Regarding drug coverage, the literature shows that Medicare Part D had no effect on the 
racial/ethnic disparity in drug coverage for African-Americans or Hispanics compared to White 
Medicare beneficiaries.129 To my knowledge, the studies by Mahmoudi and colleagues are the 
only articles that measure the impact of Part D on racial disparities in OOP spending, drug 
coverage, and drug utilization among Medicare seniors. However, they measured aggregated 
racial disparities in drug use, drug coverage, and OOP spending among individuals who reported 
heart problems, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, or hypertension. The effect of Part D may differ for 
specific subgroups of Medicare beneficiaries because treatment pattern, prescription drug use, 
disease prevalence, and prescription drug costs are varied by type of disease. Although pulling 
different diseases together can increase the generalizability of results, it can also reduce its 
precision. This study specifically focuses on diabetic patients because diabetes is the seventh 
leading cause of death in the United States; it is a fast growing preventable chronic disease with 
an annual cost of $245B, and unequal access to prescription drugs can dramatically increase 
healthcare costs. In addition, I am using the MEPS data from 2001 to 2010, which provides a 
broader window to study the impact of Part D on racial disparities. 
Literature Gap 
The impact of Medicare Part D has been extensively studied since its inception. 
Generally, existing literature has shown that Medicare Part D helped Medicare beneficiaries by 
reducing OOP spending and enhancing access to prescription drugs. Also, it has shown that 
Medicare Part D has reduced Medicare overall expenditures. However, the impact of Medicare 
Part D on racial disparities has not been studied well. Although there are some studies that 
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evaluate the impact of Part D on drug utilization, coverage, and expenditures across different 
races, the existing literature does not examine the impact of Medicare Part D on racial disparity 
among patients with diabetes, because treatment pattern, prescription drug use, and disease 
prevalence are different from other chronic conditions. This study examines the extent to which 
Medicare Part D has affected racial disparities in prescription drug use, coverage, and 
expenditures among diabetics. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
Better access to prescription drugs can play an important role in controlling healthcare 
costs, especially among those with chronic diseases. Although Medicare Part D was aimed at 
reducing costs and increasing access to prescription medications, the existence of the doughnut 
hole can substantially affect OOP spending and access to prescription drugs for beneficiaries, 
especially those with high prescription drug use. 
This study examines the impact of Medicare Part D on racial disparities in drug use, 
coverage, and expenditures among diabetics. The study considers whether disparities in 
prescription drug use, coverage, and spending have changed since Medicare Part D started in 
2006. The specific aim of this study is to examine changes in prescription drug use, coverage, 
and spending after Medicare Part D for minority racial/ethnic groups compared to Whites. I 
hypothesize that disparities in drug use, expenditures, and drug coverage would decrease 
following Medicare Part D, because beneficiaries, especially minorities, would have better 
access to prescription drugs through Part D. Medicare Part D will reduce the gap between 
minorities and Whites in drug use, coverage, and expenditures. 
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Conceptual Framework and Economic Theory 
Healthcare possesses uncertainties due to disease unpredictability and expensive health 
care services, including but not limited to prescription drugs, hospital care, and physician visits. 
Health insurance—including Medicare Part D coverage—increases access to care and reduces 
uncertainty for risk-averse individuals by assuring financial assistance in times of need. 
However, most insurance coverage plans require cost sharing. The purpose of cost sharing is to 
make individuals more conscious of health care costs and to reduce unnecessary health care 
utilization.130 
Because individual factors, health service system factors, and social factors are the main 
characteristics that can enhance or impede health care utilization, I adopted the Andersen 
model131 to measure the impact of Medicare Part D on diabetes drug use and expenditures. 
According to the Andersen model, health care consumption is determined by three elements: 
predisposing factors, enabling factors, and need. Diabetes type II, which is the dominant form 
of diabetes among seniors, is associated with age, gender, activity level, and eating habits.132-134 
I included age and gender as predisposing factors, because the risk of developing chronic 
diseases and healthcare utilization is associated with age, gender, activity level, and eating 
habits.135,136 In general, older people have a tendency to use more medications because they 
have chronic conditions and their health deteriorates faster over time. I also included education 
as a social structure under predisposing factors because education plays a significant role in 
controlling diabetes complications.137-139 It is presumed that educated people are more health 
conscious and have better eating habits compared to less educated people. In addition to 
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health insurance coverage for prescription drugs, I included social and economic resources such 
as income as an enabling factor because they facilitate the use of services. Need refers to the 
presence or severity of illness; I identified the number of chronic conditions for each individual 
to reflect the severity of disease. 
People who are eligible for Part D are more inclined to use health care because, as an 
enabling factor, it allows individuals to fill their prescriptions and reduces their OOP spending. 
However, as mentioned earlier, diabetes prevalence and management, especially for type II, 
are correlated with gender, activity level, eating habits, and education level. Therefore, this 
analysis controls for gender, education, health status, marital status, and body mass index (an 
indicator of obesity) as predisposing factors. The number of comorbid conditions falls into the 
category of need, and this analysis controls for it. Also, this analysis controls for income, which 
is an enabling factor that can facilitate the use of services. 
Methods 
Data 
This analysis is based on data from the 2001–2010 MEPS, conducted by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. MEPS includes nationally representative samples of the 
noninstitutionalized population of the United States. It collects detailed information on health 
care expenditures and use of services, insurance coverage, sources of payment, health status, 
employment, and other sociodemographic characteristics.93 In this study, I used the full-year 
consolidated data under the Household Component files, which include information on health 
status, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, employment, access to care, and 
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satisfaction with health care. This was supplemented with data from the Medical Conditions 
and Prescribed Medicines files, which provide specific information about individuals’ medical 
conditions and their prescriptions, including their insurance status, total expenditures, source 
of payment, OOP spending, and time of diagnosis.140 
The sample for this analysis included all individuals 55 years of age and older who had 
diabetes. People were included if they responded affirmatively to a question asking whether 
they had ever been diagnosed with diabetes. The overall sample included a total of 10,537 
MEPS respondents; 6,728 of them were 65 years of age and older and enrolled in Medicare Part 
D (the treatment group), and 3,809 were ages 55–64 and had no Medicare Part D coverage of 
any type (the comparison group). Because MEPS is not a perfect panel survey and does not 
follow the same individuals across the pre- and post-periods, I excluded individuals who were 
64 at the beginning of the year, even though their age at the end of the year was 65, in order to 
prevent double counting. 
Although the ideal comparison group would have been a group of seniors aged 65 and 
older who were not eligible for Part D, there is no such group. Like most previous 
studies,121,123,141 I chose near-elderly adults aged 55–64 who had diabetes but no Medicare 
coverage as the comparison group. The rationale was that these individuals must have the 
same demand for medications as seniors because they had diabetes; however, their access to 
prescription drugs might be limited based on their health insurance plan. 
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Variables 
During each round of MEPS, respondents were asked about the type of health insurance 
coverage they were enrolled in, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or a private insurance plan. They 
were also asked whether they had Medicare prescription drug benefit coverage, also known as 
Part D. Furthermore, for respondents who had at least one prescription medication purchase, 
MEPS asked whether they had a usual third-party payer for prescription medications, and if so, 
what type of payer. Respondents were classified as being enrolled in Medicare Part D coverage 
if they responded affirmatively to a question asking whether the person was covered by 
Medicare and covered by the prescription drug benefit. 
During each round of MEPS, respondents were asked to provide the name of each 
prescription filled, the total and OOP cost of each prescription, and a list of the names, 
addresses, and types of pharmacies that filled prescriptions for their household. With each 
participant’s consent, MEPS contacted the pharmacy to get detailed information on date filled, 
NDC, medication name, strength (amount and unit), quantity (package size and amount 
dispensed), and payments by source. If consent was not granted, the participant’s self-reported 
information was used. 
In this study, I examined disparities in prescription drug use, coverage, and spending 
among beneficiaries with diabetes by measuring annual drug expenditures, OOP spending, drug 
coverage, and the total number of prescriptions filled during the year. I measured the total 
number of prescriptions because the likelihood of having multiple comorbid conditions is higher 
among individuals aged 65 years and older, and people with comorbid conditions are more 
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likely to be taking nondiabetic medications.142 In addition, diabetes can be controlled with 
appropriate diet and exercise, and beneficiaries may prioritize their drugs by filling 
prescriptions for other serious conditions. Therefore, measuring only the number of 
prescriptions associated with diabetes could not reveal racial disparity in drug utilization. 
In this study, a minority is defined as anyone who is not reported as White, including 
African-Americans and Hispanics. Other ethnicities, including Asians, Indians, and Hawaiians, 
were excluded from this analysis because the goal of this study was to examine disparities in 
drug use, coverage, and expenditures between African-Americans and Whites and Hispanics 
and Whites with diabetes. In addition, literature suggests that Black–White and Hispanic–White 
disparities are a bigger problem for diabetes than disparities between Whites and other racial 
groups. Racial disparity is a difference in meeting health care needs, including treatment or 
access to care, between different racial/ethnic groups that is not justified by underlying health 
conditions. 
Analytic Strategy 
The basic approach is to (a) examine changes in prescription drug utilization and 
spending before and after the implementation of Medicare Part D for the treatment group by 
race; and (b) compare these changes to near-elderly adults to determine whether the changes 
were due to Medicare Part D or other factors. I adopted a difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) methodology to estimate the impact of Part D on racial disparities in drug 
use, coverage, and expenditures among diabetics. Using a DDD model, I estimated drug use, 
coverage, and expenditures among diabetics by race before and after Part D. Then, I measured 
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the extent to which drug use, coverage, and expenditures changed between African-Americans 
and Whites and Hispanics and Whites. 
The model compared differences in outcomes before and after 2006 for diabetic seniors 
who had Medicare Part D coverage with near-elderly diabetic adults who had no Medicare Part 
D coverage of any type. As earlier mentioned, individuals were included if they responded 
affirmatively to a question asking whether they had ever been diagnosed with diabetes. In 
other words, I compared seniors aged 65 and older to adults aged 55–64 who did not have 
prescription drug coverage through Medicare to find the extent to which diabetes drug use and 
expenditures have changed after the implementation of Medicare Part D. 
The methodology assessed the impact of Medicare Part D by comparing changes in 
utilization and spending for Part D beneficiaries by race before and after 2006 to changes for 
the comparison group. DDD analysis is acceptable if both the Part D and comparison groups 
would have experienced similar trends in diabetes drug use and expenditures in the absence of 
Medicare Part D. To test trend similarity in pre-period, I compared unadjusted differences 
between Whites and African-Americans and between Whites and Hispanics for aforementioned 
measures from 2001 to 2005. As shown in Table 1, there is not a significant difference in annual 
drug expenditures, OOP spending, drug coverage, and the total number of prescriptions 
between seniors and near-elderly adults during this time period. The regression-based DDD 
methodology further controls for other differences between the treatment and the comparison 
groups that may affect utilization and spending, including sex, education, poverty level, state 
fixed effects, marital status, comorbidity, obesity, and perceived health status. 
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The equation below represents the basic structure of the DDD model that I used to 
estimate the impact of Part D on diabetes drug use and expenditures. 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * * )
i i i i i i
i i i i
Y Race MMA Senior Race MMA Race Senior
Senior MMA Senior Race MMA Z
     
  
     
   
 (1) 
In this model, i represents an individual. Y denotes outcome measures, which are the 
total number of prescription drugs, OOP spending, prescription drug coverage, and annual drug 
expenditures. Race is a categorical variable, and Whites are set as the reference group. Race=1 
represents African-Americans and Race=2 represents Hispanics. MMA is a binary vector of time 
when Medicare Part D implemented. It is 1 if individuals were surveyed after 2006; otherwise, it 
is 0. As I mentioned earlier, I excluded individuals who were 64 at the beginning of the year, 
even though their age was reported as 65, in order to prevent double counting. Senior is a 
dummy variable representing the treatment and the comparison group. It is 1 if they are 65 
years or older (the treatment group); otherwise, it is 0 (the comparison group). I have several 
interaction terms between race and the time the survey was conducted, between being a 
senior and the time the survey was conducted, and between being a senior and race. My 
estimate of interest is the variable with triple interactions, β7. The estimate of this variable 
shows the extent to which Medicare Part D has affected drug use, coverage, and expenditures 
among beneficiaries with diabetes stratified by race. My broad approach was to estimate 
individual regressions for each treatment and comparison group and then use the estimated 
model to predict the mean level of aforementioned outcomes for African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and Whites. I estimated a pre-MMA regression and predict the conditional mean level of 
59 
 
outcomes for African-Americans, Hispanics, and Whites, holding other characteristics constant. 
I then estimated a post-MMA regression and used it to generate the predicted mean level of 
outcomes for African-Americans, Hispanics, and Whites. Instead of multiplicative effects, which 
is interpreting the estimated coefficients, I used marginal effects to predict actual expenditures 
and utilization for every combination of Race, Senior, and MMA. The significance of marginal 
effects represented in Table 8 is different than the multiplicative effects represented in Tables 
4–7 because reported effects in Table 8 are relative to the baseline estimates in their own 
category.††† Marginal effects represented in Table 8 control for differences between the groups 
in baseline effects. Also, because the model is in log format, retransforming the estimates to 
their actual values would affect associated standard errors. I did not use means of covariates 
for making prediction because mean of retransformations does not equal retransformation of 
mean.‡‡‡ 
Z is a vector of all other covariates that could affect outcomes such as education, 
poverty level, comorbidity, obesity, perceived health status, state fixed effects, marital status, 
and sex. Education is a categorical variable. Education=1 represents less than 12 years of 
education, education=2 represents 12 years of education, and education=3 represents higher 
education. Poverty level is a categorical variable. Poverty=1 represents poor or near poor 
(<125% federal poverty level [FPL]), poverty=2 represents low income (125-200% FPL), 
                                                          
††† http://www.maartenbuis.nl/publications/interactions.pdf 
‡‡‡http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/dgimhsr/documents/costanalysis.sp14.pdf 
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poverty=3 represents middle income (200-400% FPL), and poverty=4 represents high income 
(>400% FPL). Comorbidity is a categorical variable. Comorbidity=1 represents no comorbid 
condition, comorbidity =2 represents one comorbid condition, comorbidity =3 represents two 
comorbid conditions, and comorbidity =4 represents three or more comorbid conditions. 
Obesity is a categorical variable that is defined based on body mass index. Obesity=1 represents 
underweight people, Obesity=2 represents normal people, Obesity=3 represents overweight 
people, and Obesity=4 represents obese people. Health is a categorical variable that represents 
perceived health status. Health =1 represents poor health status, Health =2 represents fair 
health status, Health =3 represents good health status, and Health =4 represents very good and 
excellent health status. 
Serial correlation is one of the biggest problems in the DDD method that can undermine 
the validity of estimates.143 I aggregated the data into two groups: pre- and post-intervention. 
Creating two intervention groups reduced the likelihood of serial correlation among 
observations. To measure the impact of Part D on prescription drug utilization, I applied the 
generalized linear model (GLM) because some observations had zero prescription drugs and the 
distribution of prescription drugs was heavily skewed to the right. Using GLM allows accounting 
for a response variable that has nonstandard distribution and correctly measures the number of 
prescriptions without assuming that the drug utilization values are normally distributed. I chose 
a GLM with a log link and gamma distribution for total drug expenditures and OOP spending 
and a GLM with a log link and negative binomial distribution for the total number of 
prescriptions. I chose GLM with a log link and gamma distribution because expenditures are 
continuous but nonnormal. Using GLM allowed me to account for a response variable that had 
61 
 
nonstandard distribution and correctly counted the number of prescriptions without assuming 
drug utilization values were normally distributed. For utilization, I chose GLM with a log link and 
negative binomial distribution over Poisson distribution, because Poisson distribution assumes 
that the mean and variance are the same; however, the dataset showed that variances of 
outcomes were greater that than the means. For prescription drug coverage, I fit a logistic 
regression because the outcome was binary. 
All drug expenditures and OOP spending were converted to inflation-adjusted 2010 
dollars using the all-items CPI. I used CPI all-items instead of CPI-drugs because it represents all 
goods and services purchased for consumption including prescription drugs. Although CPI all-
items does not reflect price inflation specific to drugs, the inability of CPI-drugs to properly 
adjust for quality and entry of new drugs reduces its precision. Therefore, I used the CPI all-
items adjustment to have a better and more generalizable price representative.144 
I used sampling weights, strata, and the primary sampling unit provided in MEPS to 
account for differential selection probabilities, to adjust for nonresponses, to control for design 
effects, and to generate appropriate standard errors to reflect a nationally representative 
sample of the noninstitutionalized civilian U.S. population. Stata 12 was used to conduct all 
statistical analyses (StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
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Results 
Study Population Characteristics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for diabetic seniors and near-elderly adults. The 
overall sample includes a total of 10,154 MEPS respondents who were diagnosed with diabetes, 
6,428 of whom were in the treatment group and 3,726 of whom were in the comparison group. 
Within the treatment group, there were 2,784 and 3,644 individuals who were surveyed in pre- 
and post-periods, respectively. Within the comparison group, there were 1,504 and 2,222 
individuals who were surveyed in pre- and post-periods, respectively. The average age of the 
treatment group was 74.5, whereas it was about 60 for the comparison group. About 60 
percent of the treatment group had at least 12 years of education, whereas about 76 percent of 
the comparison group had at least 12 years of education. About 45 percent of the treatment 
group and 49 percent of the comparison group were male. More than 35 percent of people in 
both the treatment and the comparison group reported poor or fair health status. 
Unadjusted Estimates of Prescription Drug Spending and Utilization 
Table 3 demonstrates the simple means and percentages for total drug expenditures, 
OOP spending, prescription drug coverage, and the total number of prescription drugs. The 
results show that total drug expenditures for Medicare Part D beneficiaries increased by $518, 
from $3,308 before Part D to $3,826 after the implementation of Part D. There was no 
statistically significant change in total prescription drug spending for the comparison group. The 
results also show that OOP spending decreased among the treatment group by $689, from 
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$1,642 before Part D to $953 after the implementation of Part D. In addition, OOP spending 
significantly decreased for the comparison group. 
The total number of prescriptions per person (including refills) that were filled by 
seniors increased from 47.6 before Part D to 50.4 prescriptions after the implementation of 
Part D. There was no statistically significant change in total prescription drug spending for the 
comparison group. However, prescription drug coverage significantly increased only for the 
treatment group, from 36 percent before Part D to 74 percent after the implementation of Part 
D. 
Impact of Part D 
In Equation 1, I examined annual drug expenditures, OOP spending, prescription drug 
coverage, and the total number of prescriptions between African-Americans and Whites, and 
between Hispanics and Whites. Tables 4–7 represent coefficients of Equation 1 in a log-linear 
format for annual drug expenditures, OOP spending, the total number of prescription drugs, 
and drug coverage, respectively. The results show that education and income are negatively 
associated with diabetes drug use and expenditures. For instance, Medicare beneficiaries who 
had higher education and income spent less on diabetes drugs compared to poor and less 
educated individuals. As previously mentioned, I used marginal effects to predict actual 
expenditures and utilization for every combination of Race, Senior, and MMA. 
Table 8 reports marginal effects of the impact of Part D on annual drug expenditures, 
OOP spending, the total number of prescriptions, and drug coverage between African-
Americans and Whites, and between Hispanics and Whites, in terms of actual dollar value, the 
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number of prescriptions, and prescription drug coverage. These are adjusted predictions for B7 
in the model and have been calculated for both the treatment and the comparison groups 
before and after Part D. The difference reflects the net change in utilization and expenditures in 
the treatment group relative to the comparison group. 
Between African-Americans and Whites, the results show that Part D insignificantly 
increased disparities in annual drug expenditures by $446. In other words, Part D insignificantly 
increased the gap in total drug expenditures between African-Americans and Whites. On the 
other hand, Part D insignificantly decreased disparities in OOP spending and the total number 
of prescription drugs by $82 and 4.2 prescriptions, respectively. However, the results show that 
Part D significantly reduced the racial/ethnic disparity in drug coverage by 15 percent for 
African-Americans compared to White Medicare beneficiaries. 
Between Hispanics and Whites, the results show that Part D insignificantly decreased 
the disparity in annual drug expenditures and OOP spending by $397 and $286, respectively. In 
other words, Part D insignificantly decreased the gap in total drug expenditures and OOP 
spending between Hispanics and Whites. However, Part D significantly decreased disparities in 
the total number of prescription drugs and drug coverage by 8.6 (<0.05) prescriptions and 25 
percent for Hispanics compared to White Medicare beneficiaries. 
Discussion 
The findings demonstrate that the introduction of Medicare Part D reduced racial 
disparities in drug use, coverage, and spending among diabetic beneficiaries, but the effect was 
not distributed equally among minorities. In other words, when the effect was stratified by 
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race, the results show Part D significantly reduced disparity in drug coverage without having a 
significant impact on the disparities in OOP spending and the total number of prescription drugs 
between African-Americans and Whites. However, it shows that Part D significantly decreased 
the disparities in the total number of prescription drugs and drug coverage between Hispanics 
and Whites. 
Reduction in diabetes drug use implies that the gap in filling prescription drugs was 
broadened between minorities and Whites. This could happen due to the existence of the 
doughnut hole that could disproportionately impact individuals. Because the majority of 
diabetic individuals are at particularly high risk of reaching the doughnut hole due to diabetes 
drug expenditures and multiple chronic conditions, those who have a higher income are more 
prone to fill their prescriptions.84,85 Even though Part D provides access to care for seniors, 
Medicare beneficiaries could be disproportionately affected by their income. 
Although Medicare Part D significantly reduced overall OOP spending, it only reduced 
racial disparities in drug use for Hispanics with diabetes. One explanation may be that Hispanics 
have a higher rate of enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans that have drug coverage, as 
opposed to stand-alone drug plans. This is explained in detail in limitations. Those who face the 
doughnut hole are less likely to adhere to their medication, especially if they are poor, since 
they have to pay 100 percent of all drug costs. Medicare Part D was intended to increase access 
to prescription drugs and improve seniors’ health while saving money; however, unintended 
consequences like lack of adherence to diabetes medicines increase federal government 
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expenditures because untreated patients are more likely to have complications such as 
amputations or severe renal diseases. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of Medicare Part D on 
racial disparities in utilization, drug coverage, and spending among beneficiaries with diabetes. 
There are, however, a number of limitations to the analysis. 
First, the ideal comparison group would have been a group of seniors aged 65 and older 
who were not eligible for Part D. Unfortunately, there is no such group. As most previous 
studies have done,121,123,141 I chose near-elderly adults aged 55–64 who had diabetes but not 
Medicare as the comparison group. Although they may be different from seniors without 
Medicare Part D in terms of disease severity and comorbid condition, I controlled for these 
covariates in the analysis. This makes the comparison group almost equal and comparable to 
the treatment group. Second, Medicare beneficiaries could receive their drug insurance 
coverage through stand-alone prescription drug plans (PDPs) or Medicare Advantage 
prescription drug (MA-PD) plans. PDPs only cover drug expenditures, while MA-PDs cover all 
Medicare benefits including drugs. These two different plans could have different impacts on 
beneficiaries’ OOP spending. Unfortunately, I was not able to differentiate plans’ impact with 
the MEPS data. Third, diabetes treatment and medications are different for each type of 
diabetes. People with type II diabetes are more likely to take non-insulin medications to control 
their blood sugar, whereas insulin is critical for type I diabetes. In other words, diabetes, 
especially type II, can be controlled with appropriate diet and exercise, and beneficiaries may 
prioritize their drugs by filling prescriptions for other serious conditions. Therefore, I expect the 
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effect of Part D on utilization and spending be greater among type II diabetics. However, MEPS 
does not provide information on the type of diabetes. Fourth, participants in MEPS are 
surveyed apart from their U.S. residency status. Because the only effect is on utilization among 
Hispanics, this may be attributed to undocumented and illegal Hispanics who may have 
participated in MEPS. I tried to identify individuals’ residency status; however, no data is 
available on people’s citizenship status prior to 2007. Although there was no way to identify 
non-resident Hispanics among the comparison group, I only included people who had Medicare 
and were 65 years of age and older in the treatment group. This at least controlled for 
citizenship status among the treatment group because they had Medicare. Finally, lack of 
information about disease severity, physician–patient relationships, cultural factors, and 
patients’ preferences, which could vary across different racial/ethnic groups, limited my ability 
to accurately measure racial differences in drug utilization and OOP spending. 
In sum, the findings from this study suggest that Medicare Part D appears to be helpful 
in reducing disparities in drug use and coverage among diabetics. However, as the results show, 
the effect was significant among Hispanics. 
The results of this paper could be of great interest to federal or state governments, 
advocates, and policymakers who are interested in an equitable healthcare system. Part D is 
designed to increase coverage and access to drugs for all seniors; the results of this study show 
the extent to which benefits of Part D are distributed among seniors with diabetes. These 
results will help policymakers or federal officials to draft policies that reduce OOP spending 
specifically for minorities who have diabetes. Also, policymakers can promote a discounted 
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program to cover drugs for diabetic minorities 65 years of age and older who may reach the 
doughnut hole. In addition, they can take steps toward improving adherence to medicines 
because the lack of adherence can eventually increase health care system costs. In general, 
investing in supplementary programs besides Part D to reduce the financial burdens of 
diabetes, especially for minorities, could result in a long-term saving because minorities are not 
benefited compared to Whites. 
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Table 1: Trends in the Unadjusted Differences Between Whites and Minorities, Between Whites and 
African-Americans, and Between Whites and Hispanics, Who Had Diabetes Prior to the Implementation 
of Part D 
Outcome measure Difference 
between two 
groups 
2001-2003 
Difference 
between two 
groups 
2004-2005 
Difference 
over time† 
DDD‡ t(p-value) 
 Whites vs. African-Americans 
Annual Drug Expenditures  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
$160.5 
-$61.6 
$170.5 
$69.6 
$10.0 
$131.2 
-$121.2 0.03(0.85) 
Rx OOP spending  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
$407.5 
-$48.9 
$402.4 
$336.2 
-$5.1 
$385.1 
-$390.2 1.43(0.23) 
Total number of Rx  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
-0.90 
-5.33 
-1.81 
-6.20 
-1.71 
-0.87 
-0.85 0.01(0.91) 
Drug Coverage  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
0.09 
0.20 
0.14 
0.24 
0.05 
0.04 
0.01 0.00(0.99) 
 Whites vs. Hispanics 
Annual Drug Expenditures  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
$855.0 
$718.6 
$752.2 
$752.4 
-$102.8 
$33.8 
-$136.6 0.07(0.79) 
Rx OOP spending  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
$459.9 
$72.0 
$607.1 
$204.1 
$147.2 
$132.1 
$15.1 0.00(0.96) 
Total number of Rx  
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
11.1 
7.81 
9.43 
5.23 
-1.64 
-2.58 
0.94 0.03(0.86) 
Drug Coverage      
Part D (>65) 
Comparison (55-64) 
0.22 
0.31 
0.18 
0.30 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.03 0.06(0.80) 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 
2001–10. 
† Represents the difference of difference between White and minority before and after the MMA. 
‡ Represents the difference between seniors and near-elderly. 
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Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey Sample Who Had Diabetes by Target Group 
Characteristics 
All Respondents 
(N=10,154) 
% 
Part D 
N=6,428 
Comparison 
N=3,726  
Age 74.5*** 59.4 
Education 
Less than high school 
High school graduate 
Some college or more 
 
34.7*** 
33.3 
32.0*** 
 
22.2 
34.6 
45.2 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
45.8*** 
54.2*** 
 
50.6 
49.4 
Poverty level 
Poor/Near Poor (x<150% FPL) 
Low income (150% FPL<x<200% FPL) 
Middle income (200% FPL<x<400% FPL) 
High income (400% FPL<x) 
 
20.3*** 
20.6*** 
30.5* 
28.6*** 
 
14.9 
10.8 
28.6 
45.7 
Race/Ethnicity 
Non-Hispanic White 
Non-Hispanic Black 
Hispanic 
 
74.9*** 
13.5** 
11.5*** 
 
71.1 
15.1 
13.8 
Health status 
Excellent & Very Good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
 
24.5 
35.0*** 
27.7** 
12.8** 
 
25.4 
38.5 
25.1 
11.0 
Marital status 
Married 
Not married 
 
52.6*** 
47.4*** 
 
68.0 
32.0 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 
2001–10. 
Notes: Treatment group is adults aged 65 years and older who had Medicare drug benefit and were 
diabetic. The comparison group is adults aged 55–64 years who had diabetes but had no Medicare drug 
benefit. 
*The mean of this variable differs significantly between the comparison and treatment group at the 
alpha = .1 level. **Difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level. ***Difference is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. 
71 
 
Table 3: Unadjusted Outcomes Among Diabetics by Target Group Before and After Part D 
Outcomes 
All Respondents 
(N=10,154) 
Part D (N=6,428) Comparison (N=3,726) 
Before MMA After MMA Before MMA After MMA 
Annual drug expenditures 
White 
AA 
Hispanic 
$3,308 
$3,431 
$3,278 
$2,415 
$3,826*** 
$3,945*** 
$3,575 
$3,320*** 
$3,193 
$3,315 
$3,254 
$2,537 
$3,272 
$3,424 
$3,323 
$2,410 
OOP spending 
White 
AA 
Hispanic 
$1,642 
$1,763 
$1,365 
$1,229 
$953*** 
$1,032*** 
$710*** 
$709*** 
$1,138 
$1,184 
$1,028 
$1,028 
$867*** 
$934** 
$713*** 
$685*** 
Total number of Rx 
White 
AA 
Hispanic 
47.6 
48.8 
49.9 
38.4  
50.4** 
50.7 
50.3 
47.9*** 
41.0 
41.1 
46.6 
34.4 
40.7 
41.8 
40.5* 
34.6 
Drug Coverage 
White 
AA 
Hispanic 
0.36 
0.40 
0.28 
0.19 
0.74*** 
0.72*** 
0.77*** 
0.86*** 
0.73 
0.81 
0.59 
0.50 
0.72 
0.78 
0.58 
0.52 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 
2001–10. 
Notes: Treatment group is adults aged 65 years and older who had Medicare drug benefit and were 
diabetic. The comparison group is adults aged 55–64 years who had diabetes but had no Medicare drug 
benefit. 
*The mean of this variable differs significantly between the comparison and treatment group at the 
alpha = .1 level. **Difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level. ***Difference is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 4: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Coefficients of the Impact of Part D on Racial Disparity in 
Annual Drug Expenditures Among Diabetics 
Outcome Measures Coefficient (SE) 
Target Population 
African-American*MMA*Senior 
Hispanic* MMA *Senior 
 
-0.132 (0.12) 
0.142 (0.13) 
Poverty (poor) 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
 
-0.108** (0.04) 
-0.068* (0.038) 
0.001 (0.04) 
Education (<diploma) 
Diploma 
College 
 
0.018 (0.031) 
0.11*** (0.034) 
Health status (poor) 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good & Excellent 
 
-0.26*** (0.040) 
-0.44*** (0.044) 
-0.64*** (0.044) 
Sex (Male) 
Female 
 
0.126*** (0.026) 
MMA 0.121* (0.064) 
Senior 0.093* (0.056) 
 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measure is presented in parentheses. 
*p< 0.1. **p< 0.05. ***p< 0.01. 
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Coefficients of the Impact of Part D on Racial Disparity in 
Diabetes OOP Spending Among Diabetics 
Outcome Measures Coefficient (SE) 
Target Population 
African-American*MMA*Senior 
Hispanic* MMA *Senior 
 
-0.078 (0.16) 
0.093 (0.19) 
Poverty (poor) 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
 
0.064 (0.05) 
0.079* (0.048) 
0.113** (0.053) 
Education (<diploma) 
Diploma 
College 
 
0.049 (0.038) 
0.118*** (0.043) 
Health status (poor) 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good & Excellent 
 
-0.15**0 (0.048) 
-0.25*** (0.048) 
-0.46*** (0.05) 
Sex (Male) 
Female 
 
0.23***(0.033) 
MMA -0.129 (0.092) 
Senior 0.350*** (0.075) 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measure is presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Coefficients of the Impact of Part D on Racial Disparity in 
Total Number of Prescriptions Among Diabetics 
Outcome Measures Coefficient (SE) 
Target Population 
African-American*MMA*Senior 
Hispanic*MMA*Senior 
 
0.084 (0.092) 
0.132 (0.091) 
Poverty (poor) 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
 
-0.032 (0.026) 
-0.070*** (0.024) 
-0.084*** (0.027) 
Education (< diploma) 
Diploma 
College 
 
-0.041* (0.021) 
-0.023 (0.024) 
Health status (poor) 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good & Excellent 
 
-0.23*** (0.027) 
-0.41*** (0.027) 
-0.56*** (0.030) 
Sex (Male) 
Female 
 
0.126*** (0.018) 
MMA 0.111*** (0.036) 
Senior 0.160*** (0.034) 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measure is presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p< 0.01. 
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Table 7: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Coefficients of the Impact of Part D on Racial Disparity in 
Prescription Drug Coverage Among Diabetics 
Outcome Measures Coefficient (SE) 
Target Population 
African-American*MMA*Senior 
Hispanic*MMA*Senior 
 
2.32*** (0.65) 
8.19*** (2.42) 
Poverty (poor) 
Low income 
Middle income 
High income 
 
1.37*** (0.12) 
2.26*** (0.18) 
3.77*** (0.35) 
Education (< diploma) 
Diploma 
College 
 
1.39*** (0.10) 
1.33*** (0.10) 
Health status (poor) 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good & Excellent 
 
1.29** (0.12) 
1.57*** (0.15) 
1.47*** (0.16) 
Sex (Male) 
Female 
 
1.07 (0.066) 
MMA 0.86 (0.109) 
Senior 0.184*** (0.022) 
 
Note. Base case scenario of each outcome measure is presented in parentheses. 
*p< 0.1. **p< 0.05. ***p< 0.01. 
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Table 8: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Part D on OOP Spending, 
Drug Coverage, and the Total Number of Prescriptions Among Diabetics 
Outcome 
measures 
Whites vs. African-Americans 
Before MMA 
(2001-2005) 
After MMA 
(2006-2010) 
Diff of Diff 
over 
time† 
DDD 
 White AA Diff White AA Diff 
Annual drug 
expenditures 
 
Part D $3,452 $3,300 $152 $4,002 $3,728 $274 $122 
$446 
Comparison $3,266 $3,172 $94 $3,325 $3,555 -$230 -$324 
Rx OOP spending  
Part D $1,732 $1,350 $382 $1,049 $760 $289 -$93 
-$82 
Comparison $1,162 $978 $184 $931 $758 $173 -$11 
Total number of 
Rx 
 
Part D 48.7 50.5 -1.8 51.4 51.9 -0.5 1.3 
-4.2 
Comparison 40.5 46.0 -5.5 41.1 41.1 0.0 5.5 
Drug coverage  
Part D 0.40 0.28 0.12 0.72 0.77 -0.05 -0.17 -
0.15*** Comparison 0.81 0.59 0.22 0.78 0.58 0.20 -0.02 
 Whites vs. Hispanics 
White Hispanic Diff White Hispanic Diff Diff of Diff 
over 
time† 
DDD 
Annual drug 
expenditures 
 
Part D $3,452 $2,668 $784 $4,002 $3,469 $533 -$251 
-$397 
Comparison $3,266 $2,525 $741 $3,325 $2,438 $887 $146 
Rx OOP spending  
Part D $1,732 $1,196 $536 $1,049 $711 $338 -$198 
-$286 Comparison $1,162 $1,030 $132 $931 $711 $220 $88 
Total number of 
Rx 
 
Part D 48.7 39.0 9.7 51.4 49.7 1.7 -8.0 
-8.6** 
Comparison 40.5 35.1 5.4 41.1 35.1 6.0 0.6 
Drug coverage  
Part D 0.40 0.19 0.21 0.77 0.86 -0.09 -0.30 -
0.25*** Comparison 0.81 0.50 0.31 0.78 0.52 0.26 -0.05 
†Represents the difference of differences between White and minority before and after the MMA. 
*p< 0.1. **p< 0.05. ***p< 0.01. 
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Chapter 4: Closing the Medicare Doughnut Hole: The Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act 
on Prescription Drug Utilization and Out-of-Pocket Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries 
with Part D Coverage 
 
Summary 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes provisions that reduce beneficiaries’ cost sharing 
and eventually close the coverage gap (known as the “doughnut hole”) that was originally part 
of Medicare prescription drug coverage implemented in 2006. The main objective of closing the 
coverage gap through the ACA is to reduce financial burden and increase affordability of 
prescription drugs for Medicare beneficiaries who obtain prescription drug coverage through 
Medicare Part D. This study examines the impact of the doughnut hole provisions of the ACA on 
overall prescription drug utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) spending as well as by 
manufacturer type (brand vs. generic), through 2013 among Medicare Part D beneficiaries. The 
results indicate that overall OOP spending significantly decreased by an average of $119 per 
person without any significant impact on overall drug utilization. On the other hand, OOP 
spending on brand-name drugs and OOP spending as a share of total drug spending for 
Medicare seniors enrolled in Part D significantly dropped by an average of $100 and 2.7 
percentage points, respectively, after closing the coverage gap. Also, the number of brand-
name prescription drugs significantly decreased by 1.1 prescriptions. However, OOP spending 
on generic drugs and generic drug utilization did not significantly change. 
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When the sample population is limited to those who fell into the doughnut hole but did 
not reach the catastrophic coverage limit, overall OOP spending dropped significantly by an 
average of $179 per person, while overall drug utilization did not significantly change. OOP 
spending on brand-name drugs and OOP spending as a share of total drug spending were 
reduced by an average of $179 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively. Also, the number of 
brand-name prescription drugs and the number of brand-name prescription drugs as a share of 
total drug utilization significantly decreased by an average of 2.0 prescriptions and 5 
percentage points, respectively. On the other hand, generic drug utilization significantly 
increased by an average of 5.1 prescriptions. The findings from this study suggest that overall 
OOP spending significantly decreased after closing the coverage gap, mainly because of a 
significant reduction in OOP spending on brand-name drugs. Conversely, the results show that 
the decrease in brand-name drug utilization is due to a shift from brand-name drugs to 
generics. As expected, the effects were considerably larger for people who reached the 
doughnut hole spending limits. The effects on drug spending are likely to increase in the future 
as more of the provisions are phased in. 
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Introduction 
Medicare Part D was enacted under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 to reduce 
costs, increase efficiency, and increase access to prescription medications for seniors and 
disabled persons.81-83,95,96 However, a unique feature of Part D prescription drug coverage is the 
so-called “doughnut hole,” which can substantially increase OOP costs for beneficiaries, 
especially those with high prescription drug use.81-83 Under the 2010 standard benefit, 
Medicare beneficiaries with a Part D drug coverage plan had a $310 deductible and 25 percent 
copay per prescription until they reached the $2,830 coverage gap limit. Then, beneficiaries had 
to pay 100 percent of all drug costs until they incurred $6,440 in total drug costs.145 This 
coverage gap is known as the doughnut hole. 
Prior research has shown that one-fourth of Medicare beneficiaries reach the doughnut 
hole, and 20 percent of enrollees who reach the coverage gap either stop taking medications or 
reduce their medication use.76,79,83,102 The likelihood of falling into the doughnut hole is higher 
among beneficiaries who have a significant need for prescription drugs, especially those with 
chronic conditions.84,85 Evidence shows that higher treatment costs and cost sharing are 
associated with a lower rate of drug treatment, worse health outcomes, and low medication 
adherence.146-151 
To alleviate expenses associated with the coverage gap and to make prescription drugs 
more affordable for Medicare beneficiaries, the ACA gradually reduces cost sharing from 100 
percent in 2010 to 25 percent by 2020 for Part D beneficiaries who fall into the doughnut 
hole.152 Starting in 2011, as depicted in Table 1, pharmaceutical firms are required to give a 50 
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percent discount for brand-name drugs and insurers are required to bear 7 percent of generic 
drug costs when beneficiaries fall into the doughnut hole, increasing to 75 percent for generic 
drugs by 2020.152 For brand-name drugs, starting in 2013, insurers are required to bear 2.5 
percent of drug costs when beneficiaries fall into the doughnut hole, increasing to 25 percent 
by 2020.152 
A reduction in cost sharing or any price discounts could reduce the overall financial 
burdens that beneficiaries can face when they fall into the doughnut hole. The reduction in 
generic-drug cost sharing for Part D enrollees who reach the doughnut hole is gradual and may 
not be felt for some time, but any effects of price discounts on beneficiary spending for brand-
name drugs may be more immediate, given the size of the discounts (50 percent). Therefore, 
this study examines the early effects of the ACA on overall prescription drug utilization and OOP 
spending as well as by manufacturer type (brand vs. generic), for Medicare Part D beneficiaries 
through 2013 as a result of the price discount and a reduction in cost sharing. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine whether the provisions of the ACA that close the 
coverage gap have affected prescription drug utilization and OOP spending among Medicare 
seniors with Part D coverage. The study uses nationally representative survey data to examine 
changes after 2011 in overall OOP spending, total prescription drug use, OOP on brand-name 
and generic prescription drugs, and the total number of brand-name and generic prescriptions 
filled during the year. 
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Literature Review 
This section discusses prior research that has studied the impact of the Medicare 
doughnut hole on prescription drugs. It includes a review of literature that studied the impact 
of Medicare Part D and Medicare doughnut hole on prescription drug utilization, spending, and 
adherence. The focus is on these areas because the goal of Part D was to give seniors better 
access to prescription drugs and to reduce the associated financial burdens. 
Drug Utilization 
Several studies have been conducted since the inception of Medicare Part D to examine 
the impact of Medicare Part D and the Medicare doughnut hole on drug utilization. Existing 
literature demonstrates that the introduction of Medicare Part D was associated with an 
increase in drug utilization. Although the studies used different databases and various time 
frames, the results are consistent: prescription drug utilization increased by 5 to 32 percent 
among Medicare beneficiaries.116-122 However, almost all of the studies that looked at the 
impact of the Medicare doughnut hole on drug utilization found that the presence of a 
doughnut hole negatively affected the prescription fulfillment decisions made by Part D 
beneficiaries. The effects were in the form of delaying medications, switching medications, 
stopping at least one medication, or both delaying and stopping medications.153-157 A study by 
Zhang et al. found that prescription drug use decreased by 14 percent for Medicare 
beneficiaries who entered the doughnut hole relative to their use before entering the doughnut 
hole.158 
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Drug Expenditures 
Although existing literature extensively examined the impact of Part D on prescription 
drug expenditures, only a few studies have examined the effect of the Medicare doughnut hole 
on prescription drug expenditures.  
Existing literature shows that OOP spending significantly decreased after Part D 
implementation and the degree of this reduction ranged from 18 to 49 percent.118-122 However, 
using the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data, Patel et al. found that the presence of the 
Medicare doughnut hole substantially increased total and OOP annual expenditures for 
Medicare beneficiaries who had End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD).154 This demonstrates that 
prescription drug expenditures will increase as people with chronic diseases, such as ESRD fall 
into the doughnut hole. Also, literature has shown that the Medicare coverage gap resulted in 
lower total drug costs, but higher OOP spending among Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes. 
Although a reduction in total drug costs may seem unusual, the reduction in total costs appears 
to be due to a low adherence to medications among those who faced the coverage gap.159 Low 
adherence to prescription drugs can result in lower total drug costs, especially among diabetic 
patients because diabetes can be controlled with appropriate diets and exercises. 
Drug Adherence 
Since the inception of Part D, several studies have estimated the impact of Part D and 
the Medicare doughnut hole on drug adherence. The prior literature demonstrates that the 
existence of the Medicare doughnut hole has a negative impact on prescription drug 
adherence. Studies show that despite increases in drug access due to Medicare Part D, the 
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presence of the coverage gap could potentially reduce drug adherence, especially among those 
who fall into the doughnut hole. 
Using claims data, Gu et al. found that the Medicare doughnut hole has a significant 
negative impact on medication adherence among beneficiaries with diabetes.160 Another study 
that used survey data found that Medicare beneficiaries who take insulin are at higher risk of 
cost-related non-adherence compared to Medicare beneficiaries who have drug gap 
coverage.161 Also, prior research has shown that eliminating the coverage gap would not affect 
adherence to generic drugs but could reduce cost-related non-adherence for brand-name oral 
antidiabetic medications.162 
Existing literature primarily focuses on antidiabetic medications. However, in this 
analysis I include all types of medications without limiting to any therapeutic class. Such limits 
may affect the results because beneficiaries with different conditions may have different 
behavior patterns. 
Literature Gap 
Although most research to date has examined how the introduction of Part D affected 
prescription drug use and expenditures, only a few studies have examined the impact of the 
coverage gap on prescription drug use and expenditures. Overall, the literature indicates that 
the Medicare doughnut hole had a negative impact on prescription drug use and increased OOP 
spending for Medicare beneficiaries. However, the existing literature does not examine the 
impact of closing the doughnut hole on prescription drug utilization and expenditures. In 
addition, no study has stratified the effect by manufacturer type (brand or generic). This is 
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important because it can reveal the extent to which the reduction in generic drug cost sharing 
and brand-name drug discounts can impact beneficiaries’ behavior. By conducting this study, I 
will quantify the impact of closing the Medicare doughnut hole on prescription drug use and 
OOP spending. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
Prescription drug costs play an important role in increasing financial burdens. Although 
Medicare Part D was intended to reduce costs and increase access to prescription medications, 
the existence of the doughnut hole can substantially affect OOP spending and access to 
prescription drugs for beneficiaries, especially those with high prescription drug use. 
This study examines the early effects of the ACA on overall prescription drug utilization 
and OOP spending for Medicare Part D beneficiaries through 2013 as a result of the price 
discount and a reduction in cost sharing and stratifies the effect by manufacturer type (brand 
vs. generic). The study will determine whether prescription drug use and OOP spending have 
changed after the closing of the Medicare doughnut hole began in 2011 and how changes differ 
by manufacturer type. The specific aim is as follows: 
1.  Examine changes in prescription drug use and OOP spending after the ACA doughnut 
hole provisions began to phase in. 
H1: Overall OOP spending will decrease following the doughnut hole closing because 
beneficiaries will receive help when they fall into the doughnut hole. The effect will 
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be significant for brand-name drugs, given the size of the discounts (50 percent) 
compared to generic drugs. 
H2: The number of prescription drugs will increase following the doughnut hole closing 
because it will save more money for beneficiaries to spend on drugs when they fall 
into the doughnut hole. The effect will be significant for brand-name drugs, given 
the size of the discounts (50 percent) compared to generic drugs. 
Conceptual Framework and Economic Theory 
Healthcare possesses uncertainties due to disease unpredictability and expensive health 
care services, including but not limited to prescription drugs, hospital care, and physician visits. 
Health insurance—including Medicare Part D coverage—increases access to care and reduces 
uncertainty for risk-averse individuals by assuring financial assistance in times of need. 
However, most insurance coverage plans require cost sharing. The purpose of cost sharing is to 
make individuals more conscious of health care costs and reduce unnecessary health care 
utilization.130 
Because individual factors, health service system factors, and social factors are the main 
characteristics that can enhance or impede health care utilization, I adopted the Andersen 
model131 to measure the impact of closing the coverage gap on prescription drug use and 
expenditures. According to the Andersen model, health care consumption is determined by 
three elements: predisposing factors, enabling factors, and need. I include age and gender as 
predisposing factors because the risks of developing chronic diseases and healthcare utilization 
are associated with age, gender, activity level, and eating habits.135,136 In general, older people 
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have more tendencies toward using medications because they have comorbid conditions, and 
their health deteriorates faster over time. I also include race and education as social structures 
under predisposing factors because minorities have higher chronic disease prevalence and 
higher rates of disease complications, such as renal disease, blindness, and amputations.107-
109,137 Moreover, education plays a significant role in controlling chronic disease 
complications.138,139 In addition to health insurance coverage for prescription drugs, I include 
social and economic resources such as income as an enabling factor because they facilitate the 
use of services. Need refers to the presence or severity of illness, and I identify the number of 
chronic conditions for each individual to reflect the severity of a disease. 
Overall, people who are eligible for Part D will be more inclined to use health care, 
because as an enabling factor it allows individuals to fill their prescriptions and reduces their 
OOP spending. Disease severity and the number of chronic conditions fall into the category of 
need. 
Methods 
Data 
This analysis is based on data from the 2008–2013 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. MEPS includes 
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nationally representative samples of the noninstitutionalized§§§ population of the United States 
and collects detailed information on health care expenditures and use of services, insurance 
coverage, sources of payment, health status, employment, and other sociodemographic 
characteristics. I chose MEPS over other databases such as the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS) for several reasons. First, MEPS data are more recent and easier to obtain; the 
latest MCBS publicly available data are for the year 2012. Second, MEPS collects data from a 
sample of respondents’ providers to verify use of services, charges, and sources of payments. 
Unlike MCBS, which does not collect information from pharmacies, MEPS verifies collected 
information from respondents about each of the prescriptions they received during the year 
and the sources of payment by following up with the pharmacies used by survey 
respondents.163 Third, MEPS is less likely than MCBS to have differential underreporting of 
utilization in the HMO and fee-for-service sectors of Medicare because it does not rely 
extensively on insurance statements and Explanation of Medicare Benefits forms to collect 
utilization data from survey respondents. Finally, MEPS includes more accurate information on 
non-Medicare spending and beneficiaries who are not elderly, which expands the size of the 
comparison group. 
In this study, I used the full-year consolidated data under the Household Component 
files, which include information on health status, demographic and socioeconomic 
                                                          
§§§ The civilian noninstitutional population consists of people 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 
states and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (prisons, mental facilities, long-
term-care facilities, etc.). 
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characteristics, employment, access to care, and satisfaction with health care.140 This was 
supplemented with data from the Medical Conditions and Prescribed Medicines files, which 
provide specific information about individuals’ medical conditions and their prescriptions, 
including their insurance status, total expenditures, source of payment (including OOP 
spending), and time of diagnosis. 
The sample for this analysis included all individuals 55 years of age and older. The 
overall sample included a total of 17,037 MEPS respondents; 4,215 of them were 65 years of 
age and older and enrolled in Medicare Part D (the Part D group), and 12,822 of whom were 55 
years of age and older and had private prescription drug coverage (the comparison group). The 
comparison group included 3,002 participants who were 65 years of age and older and had only 
private prescription drug coverage. I excluded all individuals with family incomes below 150 
percent of the FPL because they were eligible for the low-income subsidy. The low-income 
subsidy program, which was established through Part D, provides assistance to Medicare 
beneficiaries with limited income and assets. These include Part D premiums, deductibles, 
copayments, and costs associated with the coverage gap.164 Thus, they were not affected by the 
policy change through the ACA because they paid little or no cost sharing in the doughnut hole 
prior to the policy change.165,166 
Variables 
During each round of MEPS, respondents were asked about the type of health insurance 
coverage they were enrolled in, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or a private insurance plan. They 
were also asked whether they had Medicare prescription drug benefit coverage, also known as 
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Part D. Furthermore, those who had at least one prescription medication purchase were asked 
whether the respondent had a usual third-party payer for prescription medications, and if so, 
what type of payer. Persons were classified as being enrolled in Medicare Part D coverage if 
they responded affirmatively to a question asking whether they were covered by Medicare and 
covered by the prescription drug benefit. 
During each round of MEPS, respondents were asked about the name of each 
prescription filled, the total and OOP cost of each prescription, and a list of the names, 
addresses, and types of pharmacies that filled the household’s prescriptions. With each 
participant’s consent, MEPS contacted the pharmacy to get detailed information on date filled, 
national drug code, medication name, strength (amount and unit), quantity (package size and 
amount dispensed), and payments by source. If consent was not granted, a participant’s own 
self-reported information was used. Because I intended to stratify the effect of closing the 
coverage gap on drug utilization and OOP spending by brand versus generic, and MEPS does not 
include any information regarding manufacturer type (brand vs. generic), I used Red Book,**** 
(available through Micromedex at the University of Maryland in Baltimore) and the Food and 
Drug Administration†††† website to obtain drug manufacturer type. Summing across all three 
rounds in the MEPS during the calendar year, I calculated OOP spending on brand-name and 
                                                          
****http://www.redbook.com/redbook/online/ 
†††† https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/ 
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generic drugs. I also calculated the number of brand-name and generic prescription drugs filled 
for each individual by counting the associated number of prescriptions (including refills). 
Analytical Methods 
The basic approach is to (a) examine changes in prescription drug utilization and 
spending before and after the implementation of the doughnut hole provisions of the ACA for 
Part D beneficiaries; and (b) compare these changes to other Medicare and near-elderly adults 
to determine whether the changes were due to the ACA or other factors. I adopted a 
difference-in-differences (DD) methodology to estimate the impact of closing the coverage gap 
on drug utilization and OOP spending. 
The model compared differences in outcomes between Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 
years and older who had Medicare Part D coverage but had no Medicaid or private prescription 
drug coverage (the Part D group) with Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older and 
adults aged 55–64 (near-elderly) who did not have prescription drug coverage through 
Medicare or Medicaid, but had private prescription drug coverage (the comparison group) 
before and after 2011. I did not restrict the comparison group to seniors because limiting the 
sample population to those with spending equal to the doughnut hole would leave no 
observation for some years. The comparison group represents the individuals who are most 
similar to Medicare Part D beneficiaries in terms of their sociodemographic and health 
characteristics as well as their prescription drug utilization and coverage but are not affected by 
the closing or the existence of the doughnut hole. 
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The methodology assesses the impact of the ACA by comparing changes in utilization 
and OOP spending for Part D beneficiaries before and after 2011 to changes for the comparison 
group. DD analysis is acceptable if both the Part D and the comparison groups would have 
experienced similar trends in drug use and expenditures in the absence of the doughnut hole 
provisions of the ACA. Before estimating the models, I formally tested for trend similarities in 
the outcome variables during the years leading up to the doughnut hole closure. I compared 
unadjusted differences between the Part D and comparison groups for aforementioned 
measures from 2008 to 2010. As estimates show in Table 2, there is no significant difference in 
OOP spending and number of prescribed medicines for both brand-name and generic drugs. 
The regression-based DD methodology further controls for other differences between the Part 
D and comparison groups that may affect utilization and spending, including age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, income, perceived health status, and the number of chronic conditions (based 
on MEPS priority conditions, which include some of the most prevalent and highest cost 
conditions‡‡‡‡). The analysis controlled for changes in the characteristics of both the Part D and 
the comparison groups over time that might also affect their utilization and spending. 
The equation below represents the basic structure of the DD model that I used to 
estimate the impact of closing the coverage gap on drug use and OOP spending. 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡ These include high blood pressure, coronary heart disease, angina, myocardial infarction, stroke, 
emphysema, chronic bronchitis, high cholesterol, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, asthma, and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder. 
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 Yit= β0 + β1 Timei + β2 Treatmentit + β3 (Treatment*Time)it +Zi + εit 
In this model, i represents an individual and t represents year. Y denotes outcome 
measures, which are the total number of prescriptions filled during the year, overall OOP 
spending on prescription drugs, the total number of brand-name or generic prescriptions filled 
during the year, OOP spending on brand-name or generic drugs, number of brand-name 
prescription drugs as a share of total drug utilization, or OOP spending as a share of total drug 
spending. Time is a binary vector of time when the Medicare Part D coverage gap began to 
decrease following implementation of the ACA. It is 1 if individuals were surveyed in 2011 or 
after; otherwise it is 0. I excluded individuals who were 64 at the beginning of the year to 
prevent double counting. Treatment is a dummy variable representing the Part D and the 
comparison groups. It is 1 if they were Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older who had 
Medicare drug benefit but had no Medicaid or private prescription drug coverage (the Part D 
group); otherwise it is zero (the comparison group). There is an interaction term between being 
in the treatment group and the time the survey was conducted, which is the estimate of 
interest, β3. The estimate of this variable shows the extent to which closing the coverage gap 
has impacted drug use and OOP spending between the Part D and the comparison groups. A 
positive coefficient means that closing the coverage gap increased drug utilization and 
spending, while a negative coefficient means the opposite. Z is a vector of all other covariates 
that could affect outcomes, including education, race, health status, sex, the number of chronic 
conditions, and marital status. 
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To construct the chronic condition index, I added all priority conditions reported in 
MEPS, including high blood pressure, coronary heart disease, angina, myocardial infarction, 
stroke, emphysema, chronic bronchitis, high cholesterol, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, and 
asthma. I included these conditions because they are prevalent among senior and near-elder 
populations and the existence of them can affect prescription drug use and expenditures. I 
excluded attention deficit hyperactivity disorder because it is not relevant for the Medicare 
population, and there were no persons with this condition in the sample for this analysis. Then, 
I categorized them in four categories: (a) no chronic conditions, (b) one chronic condition, (c) 
two chronic conditions, and (d) three or more chronic conditions. Although mental health 
diseases are common among the near-elderly and seniors, it is not included as one of the 
priority conditions in MEPS. However, MEPS collects information on perceived mental health 
status. Therefore, perceived mental health status was separately used to control for possible 
psychological disorders. 
Serial correlation is one of the biggest problems in the DD method that can undermine 
the validity of estimates.143 I aggregated the data into two groups: pre- and post-interventions. 
Creating two intervention groups reduces the likelihood of serial correlation between 
observations. To measure the impact of Part D on prescription drug utilization, I applied a 
generalized linear model (GLM) because some observations had zero prescription drugs and the 
distribution of prescription drugs was heavily skewed to the right. Using GLM allows accounting 
for a response variable that has a nonstandard distribution and correctly measures the number 
of prescriptions without assuming that the drug utilization values are normally distributed. I 
chose a GLM with a log link and gamma distribution for OOP spending and a GLM with a log link 
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and negative binomial distribution for the number of prescription drugs. I chose a GLM with a 
log link and gamma distribution because expenditures are continuous but nonnormal. For 
utilization, I chose a GLM with a log link and negative binomial distribution rather than Poisson 
distribution because Poisson distribution assumes that the mean and variance are the same, 
whereas the dataset showed that variances of outcomes were greater than the means. 
To measure the impact of closing the coverage gap on OOP spending as a share of total 
drug spending and brand-name prescription drugs as a share of total drug utilization, an 
ordinary least squares model was applied. 
To measure the impact of closing the coverage gap on drug utilization and OOP 
spending, I examined three different scenarios. In the first scenario, I examined changes in 
utilization and OOP spending for all Part D beneficiaries, regardless of the level of prescription 
drug utilization and spending. In the second scenario, I examined changes specifically for those 
beneficiaries who reached the Part D doughnut hole coverage limits. I did this by restricting the 
sample size to the Part D and comparison groups who spent more than the initial coverage limit 
for each year, including $2,510 or more in 2008, $2,700 or more in 2009, $2,830 or more in 
2010, $2,840 or more in 2011, $2,930 or more in 2012, and $2,970 in 2013. In the third 
scenario, I examined changes for those beneficiaries who reached the Part D doughnut hole 
coverage limits but did not reach the catastrophic threshold. Beneficiaries are responsible for 
only 5 percent of prescription drug costs after reaching the catastrophic threshold, which can 
affect their drug use and expenditures. Therefore, limiting the sample population to those who 
fell into the doughnut hole but did not reach the catastrophic coverage allowed me to 
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accurately estimate the impact of closing the doughnut hole on prescription drug use and 
expenditures. I did this by restricting the sample size to both the Part D and the comparison 
groups who spent more than the initial coverage limit but less than the catastrophic coverage 
limit for each year ($2,510 to $5,727 in 2008; $2,700 to $6,154 in 2009; $2,830 to $6,441 in 
2010; $2,840 to $6,448 in 2011; $2,930 to $6,658 in 2012; and $2,970 to $6,734 in 2013). 
All OOP spending was converted to inflation-adjusted 2013 dollars using the all-items 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). I used CPI all-items instead of CPI-drugs because the former 
represents all goods and services purchased for consumption, including prescription drugs. 
Although CPI all-items does not reflect price inflation specific to drugs, the inability of CPI-drugs 
to properly adjust for quality and entry of new drugs reduces its precision. Therefore, I used the 
CPI all-items adjustment to have a better and more generalizable price representative.144 
I used sampling weights, strata, and primary sampling unit provided in MEPS to account 
for differential selection probabilities, to adjust for nonresponses, to control for design effects, 
and to generate appropriate standard errors to reflect a nationally representative sample of the 
noninstitutionalized civilian U.S. population. Stata 12 was used to conduct all statistical analyses 
(StataCorp, College Station, TX). 
Results 
Study Population Characteristics 
Medicare Part D beneficiaries differ from the comparison group in a number of 
characteristics. About 17,000 persons were included in this analysis. Among Part D 
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beneficiaries, about 23 percent had less than a high school education compared to 11 percent 
for the comparison group (Table 3). Part D beneficiaries are also more likely to be low income—
150% FPL<x<200% FPL (17 percent) compared to 6 percent in the comparison group. As 
previously mentioned, all individuals with family incomes below 150 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) were excluded because they were eligible for the low-income subsidy. Part D 
beneficiaries were also more likely to be in fair or poor health (about 19 percent) compared to 
about 13 percent for the comparison group. Moreover, Part D beneficiaries were more likely to 
have three or more chronic conditions (65 percent) compared to 43 percent for the comparison 
group. 
Unadjusted Estimates of Prescription Drug Spending and Utilization 
Table 4 shows the simple means for overall OOP spending on prescription drugs and the 
total number of drugs. It also represents OOP spending and drug use by manufacturer type 
(brand vs. generic). These are unadjusted estimates for each group before and after the ACA. 
The results show that overall OOP spending significantly decreased among Part D 
beneficiaries—from $694 before the ACA to $493 after the implementation of the doughnut 
hole provisions. Also, there were significant increases in the total number of prescription drugs 
for both the Part D and the comparison groups. 
The results show that OOP spending on brand-name drugs significantly decreased 
among Part D beneficiaries—from $468 before the ACA to $268 after the implementation of 
the doughnut hole provisions. Also, OOP spending significantly decreased for the comparison 
group. There were significant reductions in the total number of brand-name prescription drugs 
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for both the Part D and the comparison groups after the implementation of the doughnut hole 
provisions. Although the results show that OOP spending on generic drugs did not change 
significantly, there were significant increases in the total number of generic prescription drugs 
for the Part D group after the implementation of the doughnut hole provisions. 
Among Part D beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap, there was a significant 
decrease in total drug use only among the comparison group. When the effect was stratified by 
manufacturer type, there were significant reductions in OOP spending and the total number of 
brand-name prescription drugs for both the Part D and the comparison groups after the 
implementation of the doughnut hole provisions. Presumably, the reduction in brand-name 
drug use happened because beneficiaries were substituting generics for brand-name drugs. On 
the other hand, the results show that the number of generic drugs significantly increased 
among both the Part D and the comparison groups. 
Among Part D beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap but did not reach the 
catastrophic threshold, overall OOP spending significantly decreased among both groups. When 
the effect was stratified by manufacturer type, the results show that OOP spending on brand-
name drugs and the total number of brand-name drugs significantly decreased among the Part 
D and the comparison groups. On the other hand, the results show that only the number of 
generic drugs significantly increased in both the Part D and the comparison groups. 
Impact of the ACA Doughnut Hole Provisions 
Table 5 shows the results of the DD analysis. The results reflect adjusted estimates of 
overall OOP spending and utilization and the stratified OOP spending and utilization by 
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manufacturer type (brand vs. generic), after controlling for differences between Part D 
beneficiaries and the comparison groups in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as 
well as health status and the number of chronic conditions. In other words, these are adjusted 
predictions for B3 in the model and have been calculated for both the treatment and the 
comparison groups before and after the ACA. The difference reflects the net change in 
utilization and OOP spending in the Part D group relative to the comparison group. 
The results show that overall OOP spending decreased by $119 for the Part D group 
after implementation of the ACA doughnut hole provisions. When I restricted the sample size to 
beneficiaries who spent more than the initial coverage limit, the overall OOP spending 
decreased by $179, although the difference was not statistically significant. OOP spending 
significantly decreased by $171 after restricting the sample size to those who spent more than 
the initial coverage limit but did not reach the catastrophic threshold. 
The results show that total drug utilization did not change following implementation of 
the ACA doughnut hole provisions. However, the overall prescription drug use significantly 
increased by an average of six prescriptions among beneficiaries who spent up to the coverage 
limit. When I restricted the sample size to those who reached the doughnut hole coverage gap 
but did not reach the catastrophic threshold, the overall prescription drug use increased by an 
average of 2.8 prescriptions, although the difference was not statistically significant. 
Brand 
The results show that OOP spending decreased by $100 for the Part D group after 
implementation of the ACA doughnut hole provisions. When I restricted the sample size to 
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beneficiaries who spent more than the initial coverage limit, the OOP spending on brand-name 
drugs decreased by $156 after closing the coverage gap, although the difference was not 
statistically significant. However, OOP spending on brand-name drugs significantly decreased by 
$179 after restricting the sample size to those who spent more than the initial coverage limit 
but did not reach the catastrophic threshold. 
The results also show that OOP spending on brand-name drugs, as a share of overall 
drug expenditures (both brand and generic drugs), significantly decreased by 2.7 percentage 
points for the Part D group after implementation of the ACA doughnut hole provisions. When I 
restricted the sample size to beneficiaries who spent more than the initial coverage limit, OOP 
spending on brand-name drugs, as a share of overall drug expenditures (both brand and generic 
drugs), significantly decreased by 3.7 percentage points after closing the coverage gap. In 
addition, when I restricted the sample size to those who spent more than the initial coverage 
limit but did not reach the catastrophic threshold, OOP spending on brand-name drugs, as a 
share of overall drug expenditures (both brand and generic drugs), significantly decreased by 
3.1 percentage points. 
Furthermore, the results show that total brand-name prescription drug utilization 
decreased following implementation of the ACA doughnut hole provisions. The number of 
brand-name prescription drugs significantly decreased by an average of 1.1 prescriptions 
among beneficiaries who spent up to the coverage limit. When I restricted the sample size to 
those who reached the doughnut hole coverage gap but did not reach the catastrophic 
threshold, the number of brand-name prescription drugs significantly decreased by an average 
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of 2.0 prescriptions. The number of brand-name prescription drugs as a share of total drug 
utilization decreased more than 4 percentage points among those who reached the doughnut 
hole coverage gap. 
Generic 
Finally, Table 5 also reflects adjusted estimates of utilization and OOP spending on 
generic drugs after controlling for differences between Part D beneficiaries and the comparison 
groups in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as well as health status and the 
number of chronic conditions. The results show that total generic drug utilization increased 
following implementation of the ACA doughnut hole provisions, especially among those who 
spent more than the initial coverage limit. The results demonstrate that Medicare beneficiaries 
are substituting generics for brand-name drugs as plans’ cost sharing for generic drugs 
increases over time. 
Discussion 
The findings of this study demonstrate that despite an increase in overall drug 
utilization, overall OOP spending decreased significantly after closing the coverage gap. The 
effect becomes larger when the sample size is restricted to those who fell into the doughnut 
hole. The reduction in OOP spending and the increase in utilization likely reflect the price 
discount and a reduction in cost sharing. 
When the effect was stratified by brand versus generic, the results show that utilization 
and OOP spending on brand-name drugs decreased significantly after closing the coverage gap, 
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and the effect was larger among Part D beneficiaries who reached the doughnut hole. The 
reduction in OOP spending on brand-name drugs likely reflects the 50 percent discount on the 
cost of brand-name drugs that pharmaceutical companies were required to give Part D 
enrollees who reached the doughnut hole in 2011, 2012, and 2013. However, other reasons 
such as patent expiration and generic substitution at pharmacies could result in this reduction. 
The results indicate that OOP spending decreased after implementation of the ACA 
doughnut hole provisions. This is consistent with the intent of the doughnut hole provisions, 
which was to increase access to prescription drugs and reduce the economic burden associated 
with prescription drugs. Although an increase in the total number of brand-name prescription 
drugs was expected, given the size of the discount, the results show that the total number of 
brand-name prescription drugs decreased after closing the coverage gap. It is mostly because 
beneficiaries are substituting generics for brand-name drugs. Even though beneficiaries get a 
greater discount on brand-name drugs when they fall into the doughnut hole, there is a big 
difference in drug prices between a brand-name drug and its generic substitute. For example, in 
2013, the wholesale acquisition cost for 30 pills of Actos 30 mg, an antidiabetes drug, was 
about $360, while it was $13 for Pioglitazone, its generic substitute. After taking the discount 
and cost sharing into account, 30 pills of Actos 30 mg could cost beneficiaries $170 when they 
were in the doughnut hole, while it was $10 for Pioglitazone. Therefore, it is likely that 
beneficiaries are substituting generics for brand-name drugs, especially when they fall into the 
doughnut hole. 
102 
 
A negative effect on brand-name drug utilization could also be due to other utilization 
behaviors that individuals might engage in order to reduce their costs, such as skipping 
medications on alternate days or splitting pills. Furthermore, a shift in prescription supply from 
30-day to 90-day, which is common among individuals with chronic conditions, can justify this 
effect because their records would show one prescription instead of three prescriptions. 
However, the MEPS does not ask any questions regarding these behaviors or prescription 
supply. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of closing the coverage 
gap on prescription drug utilization and spending. There are, however, a number of limitations 
to the analysis. 
First, because closing the coverage gap started in 2011 and gradually expands through 
2020, the analysis shows only the early effects of the policy and not the full effects that are 
likely to grow in subsequent years. Despite a continued high cost-sharing rate for generic drugs 
in the 3 years following implementation, the discount for brand-name drugs is large enough (50 
percent) to expect some immediate change in prescription drug spending, especially for those 
who reach the doughnut hole coverage gap. 
Second, while the analysis controls for differences based on age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
income, the number of comorbid conditions, and health status, there may be other differences 
between Part D beneficiaries and the comparison groups not accounted for in the analysis that 
could affect the results. However, the combination of Medicare beneficiaries and near-elderly 
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adults with a private prescription drug plan is arguably the best available comparison group in 
the MEPS or any other data source that could be used to conduct this study. 
Third, Medicare beneficiaries can receive their drug insurance coverage through stand-
alone prescription drug plans (PDPs) or Medicare Advantage prescription drug (MA-PD) plans. 
PDPs only cover drug expenditures, whereas MA-PDs cover all Medicare benefits including 
drugs. These two different plans could have different impacts on beneficiaries’ OOP spending, 
as beneficiaries with MA-PD plans will face less financial burden compared to beneficiaries with 
PDP plans. Unfortunately, I was not able to differentiate the impact using the MEPS data. 
The impact of the ACA on Medicare Part D prescription drug spending is likely to 
increase as additional provisions phase in. Although discounts for brand-name drugs will stay 
the same (50 percent) through 2020, patient cost sharing for brand-name drugs will decrease to 
45 percent in 2015 and 25 percent in 2020, while cost sharing for generic drugs will decrease to 
65 percent in 2015 and 25 percent in 2020. The gradual closing of the coverage gap comes at a 
time of accelerating growth of specialty drugs in the pipeline, mostly higher cost biological 
drugs, which are expected to increase overall healthcare costs in future. 
In sum, the findings from this study suggest that the ACA doughnut hole provisions 
appear to be effective by decreasing OOP spending and increasing access to prescription drugs 
for Part D beneficiaries. As expected, the effects are considerably larger for people who reach 
the doughnut hole spending limits. The effects on drug spending are likely to increase in the 
future as more of the provisions are phased in. 
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Table 1: Cost Sharing and Pharmaceutical Discounts for Part D Beneficiaries Who Fall Into the Doughnut 
Hole by Drug Type, Brand-Name vs. Generic 
Plan year 
 Generic drugs Brand-name drugs 
% Medicare 
recipient pays 
% Plan pays 
% Medicare 
recipient pays 
% Plan pays 
% Manufacturer 
pays 
<2011 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
2011 93% 7% 50% 0% 50% 
2012 86% 14% 50% 0% 50% 
2013 79% 21% 47.5% 2.5% 50% 
2014 72% 28% 47.5% 2.5% 50% 
2015 65% 35% 45% 5% 50% 
2016 58% 42% 45% 5% 50% 
2017 51% 49% 40% 10% 50% 
2018 44% 56% 35% 15% 50% 
2019 37% 63% 30% 20% 50% 
2020 25% 75% 25% 25% 50% 
  
105 
 
Table 2: Trends in the Unadjusted Differences Between the Part D and the Comparison Groups Before 
the ACA 
 
Outcome measures Difference in 
Part D group, 
2008-2010 
Difference in 
comparison 
group, 2008-2010 
DD‡ t(p-value) 
Overall 
Rx OOP spending -$2.6 -$19.8 $17.2 0.80 (0.06) 
Total number of Rx -1.2 -0.3 -0.9 0.68 (0.17) 
Brand-name drugs 
Rx OOP spending -$1.6 -$30.0 $28.4 0.26 (0.61) 
Total number of Rx -2.8 -2.2 -0.6 0.35 (0.55) 
Generics drugs 
Rx OOP spending -$1.0 $9.2 -$10.2 0.68 (0.17) 
Total number of Rx 1.6 1.9 -0.3 0.83 (0.04) 
‡Represents the difference between the Part D and comparison groups. 
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Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Demographic Characteristics of the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey Sample by Target Group 
Characteristics 
All respondents 
(N=17,037) 
% 
Those with spending 
equal to doughnut hole 
(N=3,571) 
% 
Part D 
N=4,215 
Comparison 
N=12,822 
(3,002 are 
seniors) 
Part D 
N=981 
Comparison 
N=2,590 
Education 
Less than high school 
High school graduate 
Some college or more 
 
23.6*** 
32.2*** 
44.2*** 
 
10.9 
25.6 
63.5 
 
24.9*** 
33.1*** 
42.0*** 
 
11.7 
26.5 
61.8 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
 
43.6*** 
56.4*** 
 
48.4 
51.6 
 
42.9** 
57.1** 
 
48.7 
51.3 
Poverty level 
Low income (150% FPL<x<200% 
FPL) 
Middle income (200% FPL<x<400% 
FPL) 
High income (400% FPL<x) 
 
16.8*** 
41.3*** 
41.9*** 
 
6.2 
27.6 
66.2 
 
16.5*** 
42.9*** 
40.6*** 
 
6.4 
28.4 
65.2 
Race/Ethnicity 
Non-Hispanic White 
Non-Hispanic Black 
Hispanic 
Non-Hispanic Other 
 
84.4* 
5.8*** 
6.7*** 
3.1*** 
 
82.6 
7.4 
5.2 
4.8 
 
86.1 
5.3 
5.1 
3.5 
 
85.9 
6.6 
4.2 
3.3 
Health status 
Excellent & Very Good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
 
48.5*** 
32.6* 
14.7*** 
4.2*** 
 
57.0 
30.2 
10.1 
2.7 
 
29.6*** 
38.8 
22.6 
9.0* 
 
36.5 
37.3 
19.3 
6.9 
Marital status 
Married 
Not married 
 
58.1*** 
42.9*** 
 
72.6 
27.3 
 
57.8*** 
42.2*** 
 
72.6 
27.4 
Chronic Conditions 
0 
1 
2 
≥3 
 
2.7*** 
11.1*** 
21.4*** 
64.8*** 
 
9.1 
21.5 
26.0 
43.4 
 
0.7** 
4.8*** 
9.9*** 
84.6*** 
 
2.2 
10.5 
16.9 
70.4 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 
2008–13. 
Notes: Part D group is adults aged 65 years and older who had Medicare drug benefit but had no 
Medicaid coverage or private prescription drug coverage. The comparison group is Medicare 
beneficiaries aged 65 years and older and adults aged 55–64 years who had no Medicare drug benefit 
and Medicaid coverage but had private prescription drug coverage. 
107 
 
*Difference is statistically significant at 0.1 level. **Difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
***Difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 4. Unadjusted Estimates of Effects of Closing the Doughnut Hole on Drug Use and Expenditures. 
Outcomes 
All respondents 
Those with spending equal to 
doughnut hole 
Those with spending equal to doughnut 
hole but less than the catastrophic 
coverage 
(N=17,037) (N=3,571) (N=2,496) 
Part D Comparison Part D Comparison Part D Comparison 
Before 
ACA 
After 
ACA 
Before 
ACA 
After 
ACA 
Before 
ACA 
After 
ACA 
Before 
ACA 
After 
ACA 
Before 
ACA 
After ACA 
Before 
ACA 
After 
ACA 
Overall 
OOP Spending 
Number of Rx  
 
$694 
31.9 
 
$493*** 
29.5** 
 
$507 
22.9 
 
$423*** 
21.1*** 
 
$1,606 
56.8 
 
$1,325 
61.9 
 
$1,261 
47.8 
 
$1,183 
45.1*** 
 
$1,310 
50.2 
 
$1,069*** 
51.3 
 
$967 
40.3 
 
$868** 
38.2 
Brand 
OOP Spending 
Number of Rx  
 
$468 
9.5 
 
$268*** 
5.2*** 
 
$338 
8.3 
 
$243*** 
5.2*** 
 
$1,197 
21.8 
 
$887*** 
15.3*** 
 
$920 
21.0 
 
$811* 
15.8*** 
 
$952 
18.3 
 
$674*** 
11.6*** 
 
$681 
17.1 
 
$566*** 
12.5*** 
Generic 
OOP Spending 
Number of Rx  
 
$226 
22.4 
 
$226 
24.3* 
 
$169 
14.5 
 
$180 
15.9*** 
 
$407 
35.0 
 
$438 
46.5*** 
 
$341 
26.7 
 
$372 
29.3* 
 
$358 
31.9 
 
$395 
39.7*** 
 
$286 
23.2 
 
$302 
25.7* 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 2008–13. 
Notes: Part D group is adults aged 65 years and older who had Medicare drug benefit but had no Medicaid coverage or private prescription drug 
coverage. The comparison group is Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older and adults aged 55–64 years who had no Medicare drug 
benefit and Medicaid coverage but had private prescription drug coverage. OOP = out-of-pocket. Rx = prescription drugs. $ = expenditures. % = 
percent. 
**Difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level. ***Difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 5. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects of Closing the Doughnut Hole on Drug Use and Expenditures. 
Outcome 
All respondents 
(N=17,037) 
Those with spending equal to 
doughnut hole 
(N=3,571) 
Those with spending equal to 
doughnut hole but less than the 
catastrophic coverage 
(N=2,496) 
Part D Comparison D 
Diff 
Part D Comparison D 
Diff 
Part D Comparison D 
Diff 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Overall 
OOP spending 
Total # of Rx 
 
$416 
21.3 
 
$488 
29.8 
 
$508 
22.8 
 
$699 
32.2 
 
-$119*** 
-0.8 
 
$1,019 
38.2 
 
$1,210 
54.3 
 
$1,126 
40.2 
 
$1,496 
50.3 
 
-$179 
6.0** 
 
$827 
34.0 
 
$1,003 
47.4 
 
$929 
35.6 
 
$1,276 
46.2 
 
-$171*** 
2.8 
Brand-name 
OOP spending 
 
OOP as a share 
of overall Rx $ 
(Brand+ 
Generic) 
 
Total # of Rx 
 
Drug use as a 
share of 
overall 
utilization 
 
$472 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
9.6 
 
 
0.30 
 
$263 
 
0.10 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
0.17 
 
$342 
 
0.15 
 
 
 
8.4 
 
 
0.36 
 
$234 
 
0.11 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
0.23 
 
-$100*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
 
 
-1.1** 
 
 
0.0004 
 
$1,139 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
20.0 
 
 
0.45 
 
$873 
 
0.15 
 
 
 
14.3 
 
 
0.32 
 
$849 
 
0.16 
 
 
 
18.7 
 
 
0.52 
 
$704 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
14.2 
 
 
0.42 
 
-$156 
 
-0.037** 
 
 
 
-1.3 
 
 
-0.041** 
 
$957 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
17.8 
 
 
0.44 
 
$647 
 
0.16 
 
 
 
11.5 
 
 
0.30 
 
$681 
 
0.16 
 
 
 
16.2 
 
 
0.44 
 
$551 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
11.9 
 
 
0.42 
 
-$179*** 
 
-0.031** 
 
 
 
-2.0** 
 
 
-0.050** 
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Generic 
OOP spending 
Total # of Rx 
 
$231 
22.6 
 
$224 
24.5 
 
$168 
14.5 
 
$182 
16.1 
 
-$20 
0.3 
 
$363 
30.3 
 
$367 
39.6 
 
$282 
21.6 
 
$307 
23.7 
 
-$22 
7.2*** 
 
$323 
28.5 
 
$348 
35.6 
 
$252 
19.7 
 
$268 
21.7 
 
$8 
5.1** 
Sources: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, Household Component, 2008–13. 
Notes: Estimates for the Part D and comparison groups are the marginal effect for each group before and after the ACA. Part D group is adults 
aged 65 years and older who had Medicare drug benefit but had no Medicaid coverage or private prescription drug coverage. The comparison 
group is Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older and adults aged 55–64 years who had no Medicare drug benefit and Medicaid coverage 
but had private prescription drug coverage. OOP = out-of-pocket. Rx = prescription drugs. $ = expenditures. % = percent. 
**Difference is statistically significant at 0.05 level. ***Difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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